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RECLASSIFICATION RISKS FOR COMPENSATION PAID BY 
SAND C CORPORATIONS TO SHAREHOLDER-EMPLOYEES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. CHOICE OF ENTITY STATISTICS 
Although LLCs have gained increasing popularity over the last 10-15 years, the 
number of entities taxed as S corporations still exceeds the number of entities 
taxed as partnerships for federal tax purposes, and it is projected to stay that way 
for the foreseeable future, as set forth in the table below published by the IRS 
(Document 6292, Office of Research, Analysis and Statistics, Fiscal Year Retum 
Projections for the United States: 2013-2020, Rev. June, 2014): 
St t' t' R a IS ICS etmr m2 OICe 0 ll HV d' Ch ' fE t't 
2013 2015 2018 2021 
(Actual) (Projected) (Projected) (Projected) 
Form 1065 3,685,725 3,774,800 3,893,800 4,042,800 
Form 1120S 4,566,216 4,587,500 4,669,400 4,727,400 
Form 1120 1,080,099 1,217,200 1,308,900 1,319,300 
B. DOUBLE TAX ON EARNINGS OF C CORPORATION DISTRIBUTED 
AS DIVIDENDS TO SHAREHOLDERS 
Although many existing "C" corporations have converted to S corporation status 
(or other form of passthrough entity) and most new entities have been fonned as 
some type of passthrough entity (S corporation, LLC or partnership), many 
professional and other personal service corporations have remained C 
corporations based on the assumption that they can successfully avoid the double 
tax on eamings to which C corporations are generally subject by utilizing the 
strategy of zeroing out their taxable income by payment of all or substantially all 
of their eamings as deductible compensation to their shareholder-employees. It 
has been widely accepted in the past by practitioners and taxpayers that the IRS 
cannot successfully assert unreasonable compensation arguments against a 
personal service corporation to recharacterize a portion of the compensation paid 
to its shareholder-employees as dividend distributions. However, in light of the 
application of the "independent investor test" by the Tax Court and the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Mulcahy, Pauritsch, Salvador & Co., 680 F.3d 867 
(7th Cir. 2012)., and the Tax Court's prior decision in Pediatric Surgical 
Associates, P.C. v. Comm 'r, TCM 2001-81, tax practitioners must recognize that 
the IRS can make a successful argument to recharacterize the wages paid to the 
shareholders-employees of a personal service corporation as dividends subject to 
double taxation. 
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C. DOUBLE TAX ON SALE OF ASSETS OF C CORPORATION 
Likewise, most entities have either converted from "C" status to "S" status or to 
some other form of passthrough entity or been fonned as a passthrough entity to 
avoid the double tax on the sale of assets to which "C" corporations are subject. 
However, in order to avoid double taxation on the sale of a professional or other 
service corporation's assets to a third party, tax practitioners have often sought to 
avoid the double tax imposed upon C corporation's selling their assets by 
allocation of a large portion of the purchase price to the "personal goodwill" of 
the shareholders of the professional corporation. Although this strategy has 
worked under certain circumstances, very recent cases have suggested that the 
IRS can and will recharacterize so-called personal goodwill as corporate goodwill 
subject to double taxation (or at the least to ordinary income tax rates rather than 
capital gain tax rates) on the sale of the assets of a professional corporation. 
II. UNREASONABLY IDGH COMPENSATION AND C CORPORATIONS 
A. LAW 
The relevant authority in this area is Section 162(a)(l), which allows a deduction 
for ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during a taxable year in 
carrying on a trade or business, including a "reasonable allowance" for salaries or 
other compensation for personal services actually rendered. 
Reg. § 1.162-7 (a) provides that the test of deductibility in the case of 
compensation payments is whether such payments are reasonable and are, in fact, 
payments purely for services. Consequently, there is a two-prong test for the 
deductibility of compensation payments: (1) whether the amount of the payment 
is reasonable in relation to the services performed, and (2) whether the payment 
was, in fact, intended to be compensation for services rendered. 
Reg. §1.162-7(b)(l) additionally provides that any amount paid in the form of 
compensation, but not in fact as the purchase price of services, will not be 
deductible. The regulation continues as follows: "An ostensible salary paid by a 
corporation may be a distribution of a dividend on stock This is likely to occur in 
the case of a corporation having few shareholders, practically all of whom draw 
salaries. If in such a case the salaries are in excess of those ordinarily paid for 
similar services and the excessive payments correspond or bear a close 
relationship to the stockholdings of the officers or employees, it would seem 
likely that the salaries are not paid wholly for services rendered, but that the 
excessive payments are a distribution of earnings upon the stock" 
Reg. §1.162-7(b)(2) provides that the fmm or method of fixing compensation will 
not be decisive as to deductibility. The regulation continues that although any 
form of contingent compensation invites scrutiny as a possible distribution of 
earnings of the corporation, it does not necessarily follow that payments on a 
contingent basis will be treated fundamentally on any basis different than that 
applying to compensation at a flat rate. 
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Reg. § 1.162-7 (b )(3) provides that "the allowance for the compensation paid may 
not exceed what is reasonable under all the circumstances. It is, in general, just to 
assume that reasonable and true compensation is only such amount as would 
ordinarily be paid for like services by like enterprises under like circumstances." 
Reg. § 1.162-8 provides that in the case of excessive payments by corporations, if 
such payments correspond or bear a close relationship to stockholders, and are 
found to be a distribution of earnings or profits, the excessive payments will be 
treated as a dividend. 
Reg. § 1.162-9 provides that bonuses to employees will constitute allowable 
deductions from gross income if such payments are made in good faith and as 
additional compensation for the services actually rendered by the employees, 
provided such payments, when added to salaries, do not exceed a reasonable 
compensation for the services rendered. 
As discussed above, the regulations set forth a two-prong test for the deductibility 
of compensation payments: (1) whether the amount of payment is reasonable in 
relation to the services performed, and (2) whether the payment was, in fact, 
intended to be compensation for services rendered. Although a majority of the 
cases focus on the reasonableness of the compensation paid, and do not focus 
separately on the intent of the payment, several cases have discussed the intent 
requirement. 
B. COMPENSATORY INTENT 
In detetmining whether the payment was intended to be compensation for services 
rendered, the courts have relied heavily on the initial characterization of the 
payment by the corporation and have focused on such objective criteria as 
whether the board of directors authorized the payment of the compensation in 
question, whether employment taxes were withheld from the payment, whether a 
Form W-2 was issued with regard to the payment in question, and whether the 
payment was deducted on the accounting records or tax records of the corporation 
as salary. 
The leading case in this area is Paula Construction Co. v. Comm 'r, 58 TC 1055 
(1972), aff'd per curiam, 474 F.2d 1345, 73-1 USTC ~9283 (5th Cir. 1973). In 
Paula Construction, the shareholder-employees believed that the corporation's 
Subchapter S status was in effect (it had been inadvertently and retroactively 
terminated for the years in issue), and as such, did not reflect the corporation's 
distributions as compensation in the corporate records or its tax returns as it 
believed such distributions would be nontaxable distributions from the S 
corporation to its shareholders. In holding that the corporation was not entitled to 
a compensation deduction for the amounts paid, the Tax Court stated that "it is 
now settled law that only if payment is made with the intent to compensate is it 
deductible as compensation .... Whether such intent has been demonstrated as a 
factual question is to be decided on the basis of the particular facts and 
circumstances of the case." See also Electric & Neon v. Comm 'r, 56 TC 1324 
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(1971), aff'd per curiam, 496 F.2d 876, 74-2 USTC ~9542 (5th Cir. 1974), and 
International Capital Holding Corp. v. Comm 'r, TCM 2002-109, in which the 
Tax Court found that payments made to a management company were intended to 
compensate the recipient for services rendered. Since the IRS conceded the 
reasonableness of the amount paid, the payments were found to be deductible. 
But see Neonatology Associates P.A., et al. v. Comm 'r, 2002 USTC ~50,550 (3rd 
Cir. 2002), aff'g TCM 2001-270, where the Third Circuit affirmed the Tax Court 
in three cases on VEBA deductions by medical corporations, holding that the 
corporations could not deduct payments made to the VEBAs since the VEBAs 
were not designed to provide benefits to employees, but were instead intended to 
benefit the sponsoring owners of the VEBAs, and treating the payments as 
constmctive dividends. These cases make it clear that it is absolutely necessary to 
properly document payments made by a corporation to its shareholder-employees 
as compensation (rather than as dividend distributions) in order for the payments 
to be deductible. See also IRS Field Service Advice, 1994 W.L. 1725566 
(addressing compensatory intent in the context of a law firm); IRS Field Service 
Advice, 1995 W.L. 1918240; IRS Field Service Advice 200042001; GCM 36801 
(1976); and Nor-Cal Adjusters v. Comm 'r, 74-2 USTC ~9701 (9th Cir. 1974). 
C. REASONABLENESS OF COMPENSATION AND THE MULTI-FACTOR 
TEST 
The leading case in the unreasonable compensation area is Mayson 
Manufacturing Co. v. Comm 'r, 178 F.2d 115, 49-2 USTC ~9467 (6th Cir. 1949), 
which sets forth nine factors to be used in evaluating the reasonableness of the 
amount of an employee's compensation. These factors have generally been used 
in one form or another in almost all subsequent cases analyzing the 
reasonableness of compensation. 
The nine factors set forth in the Mayson case are as follows: 
1. the employee's qualifications, 
2. the nature, extent, and scope of the employee's work, 
3. the size and complexities of the business, 
4. a comparison of the salaries paid with the gross income and the net 
income of the business, 
5. the prevailing general economic conditions, 
6. a comparison of salaries with distributions to stockholders, 
7. the prevailing rates of compensation for comparable positions and 
comparable businesses, 
8. the salary policy of the taxpayer for all employees, 
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9. the compensation paid to the pmiicular employee in prior years where the 
business is a closely-held corporation. 
Another significant case utilizing the multi-factor test is Elliotts Inc. v. Comm 'r, 
716 F.2d 1241, 83-2 USTC 'lf9610 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'g TCM 1980-282. Elliotts 
involved a corporation that sold and serviced equipment manufactured by John 
Deere Company and other manufacturers. The taxpayer's sole shareholder, 
Edward G. Elliotts, was found to have total managerial responsibility for the 
taxpayer's business and was the ultimate decision and policy maker and, in 
addition, performed the functions usually delegated to sales and credit managers. 
He worked approximately 80 hours each week. 
The taxpayer had compensated Elliotts by paying a base salary plus a year-end 
bonus, which, since incorporation, had been fixed at 50% of net profits (before 
deduction for taxes and management bonuses). On audit of the 1975 and 1976 tax 
years, the IRS determined that a portion of the compensation paid to Elliotts was 
unreasonable in amount. 
After reviewing the testimony and statistical evidence presented by the parties, the 
Tax Court concluded that the payments to Elliotts, in addition to providing 
compensation for personal services, were intended in part to distribute profits and 
were, therefore, nondeductible dividends. 
The taxpayer appealed the Tax Court's dete1mination to the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit's opinion is important for three main 
reasons. First, the Ninth Circuit recognized that in analyzing the two-prong test 
for deductibility under Section 162(a)(1), a taxpayer's proof that the amount paid 
is reasonable will often result in similar proof that the purpose for which the 
payments are made is compensatory. 
The second reason Elliotts is important is that the comi rejected any requirement 
that a profitable corporation should use part of its earnings to pay dividends. 
First, the court stated that no statute requires profitable corporations to pay 
dividends. Second, any such requirement is based on the faulty premise that 
shareholders of a profitable corporation will demand dividends. Third, it may 
well be in the best interest of the corporation to retain and invest its earnings. 
Although the first two issues outlined above are important, Elliotts is probably 
more impmiant for categorizing the nine Mayson factors discussed above into the 
following five categories: 
1. The employee's role in the company, including as relevant to such 
consideration the position held, hours worked and duties performed by the 
employee, in addition to the general importance of the employee to the 
success of the company. 
2. An external comparison of the employee's salary with those paid by 
similar companies for similar serv1ces. Thus, if a shareholder is 
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performing the work of three employees, for example, the relevant 
comparison would be the combined salaries of those three employees in a 
similar corporation. 
3. The character and condition of the company as indicated by its sales, net 
income, and capital value, together with the complexities of the business, 
as well as general economic conditions. 
4. Whether some relationship exists between the corporation and its 
shareholder-employee which might pe1mit the company to disguise 
nondeductible corporate distributions of income as salary expenditures 
deductible under Section 162(a)(l). This category employs the 
independent investor standard, which provides that if the company's return 
on equity remains at a level that would satisfy an independent investor, 
there is a strong indication that management is providing compensable 
services and that profits are not being siphoned out of the company as 
disguised salary. 
5. A reasonable, long-standing, consistently applied compensation plan is 
evidence that the compensation paid for the years in question is 
reasonable. 
In addition to the factors established by the courts, the IRS has developed its own 
factors set forth in the Internal Revenue Manual, I.R.M. 4233, Part IV, 
Examination, at Section 4.3.1.5.2.5.2.2. See also Martin and Harris, 
"Umeasonable Compensation: Pediatric Surgical Poses a Major New Threat for 
PCs," 97 J. Tax'n 41 (July 2002). The favorable factors (indicative of a finding of 
reasonable compensation) listed in prior versions of the Internal Revenue Manual 
include the following: 
1. long hours, 
2. uniqueness of the employee's contribution, 
3. success in turning the company around, 
4. the company's above-average growth or profitability, 
5. experience level of the employee, 
6. high productivity and effectiveness of the employee, 
7. bonus arrangements entered into prior to becoming a stockholder, 
8. whether the employee was offered a higher salary by outsiders, 
9. inability of the employee to control compensation levels or dividends, 
10. salary compared favorably with that of employees of other companies, 
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11. employee was undercompensated in previous years, and 
12. high retum on equity. 
Unfavorable factors (indicative of a finding of unreasonable compensation) listed 
in prior versions of the Intemal Revenue Manual) include the following: 
1. compensation rate exceeded that of comparable companies, 
2. lack of dividend payments, 
3. inappropriate compensation formulas, 
4. lack of unique employee skills, 
5. employee spent little time on the job or worked less than in previous years, 
6. the board of directors was not independent, 
7. salary increased without increase in duties, and 
8. bonus formulas changed because of high profits. 
Following the Mayson and Elliots cases, numerous cases have applied the multi-
factor test in determining the reasonableness of compensation. 
Klamath Medical Service Bureau v. Comm 'r, 29 TC 339 (1957), aff'd 261 F2d 
842 (9th Cir 1958), cert denied 359 US 966, involved a corporation engaged in 
the business of providing medical, surgical and hospital services under contract. 
The stockholders were the doctors who performed these services. The court held 
that the amount which equaled 100% of the doctors' billings represented 
compensation for services rendered. 
In Edwardo Catalano, Inc. v. Comm'r, TCM 1979-183, the Tax Court had to 
determine whether the salary paid by a professional corporation to its sole 
shareholder-employee was excessive. Mr. Catalano was a well-known 
professional architect and the sole shareholder and only employee of his 
professional corporation. While the corporation paid Mr. Catalano large salaries 
from 1969 through 1973 (the years in issue), the corporation still had taxable 
income remaining after his salary was paid. In determining whether the salary 
paid by the corporation was excessive, the comi looked at the Mayson factors and 
found that since the company had adequate sources from which to pay Mr. 
Catalano without threatening its own financial status, it could not support a 
finding that such payment was unreasonable in amount. 
Anthony LaMastro v. Comm'r, 72 TC 377 (1979), was an unusual case in that the 
IRS had the burden to prove that compensation paid to the taxpayer was 
unreasonable. Given that the IRS initially raised the issue in its amended 
pleading, Rule 142(a) of the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure placed the 
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burden on the IRS. Despite the taxpayer's argument for reasonableness based on 
the fact that his amount of work was comparable to that performed by him during 
other periods, the court disagreed with the relevance of this contention. Instead, 
the comi mled that the amounts contributed by taxpayer to his pension plan were 
unreasonable as compensation and found in favor of the IRS. 
In Lloyd Schumacher Chevrolet-Buick v. Comm 'r, 80-2 USTC ~ 9576 (SD Ill 
1980), the taxpayer was an Illinois automobile dealer whose sole stockholder-
employee was responsible for all of the company's operations. The employee 
received a small base salary, plus an incentive bonus based on 30% of the 
corporation's earnings. The court mled that the amounts paid were reasonable, 
because the facts revealed that the corporation's business volume and profits had 
increased significantly under the stockholder's direction. A similar conclusion 
was reached by the court in Automotive Investment Development, Inc. v. Comm 'r, 
TCM 1993-298. The comi concluded that the sole shareholder's management and 
leadership skills were primarily responsible for the corporation's significant 
success. The court also recognized the shareholder's extensive experience in the 
industry, extensive duties on the company's behalf, and the significant amount of 
time devoted by him to the business. 
Similarly, in Mortex Manufacturing Company v. Comm'r, TCM 1994-110, the 
court held that compensation paid to taxpayer's executive employees (excluding a 
new employee who was still in training) was reasonable after taking into account 
the history of the corporation's business and the services provided by each 
employee. The court then noted that the taxpayer had been in excellent financial 
condition since its incorporation and had maintained an excellent financial rating. 
The court also noted that the total compensation paid by the corporation to its 
shareholder-employees had averaged approximately 32% of net sales. 
In L&B Pipe & Supply Company v. Comm'r, TCM 1994-187, the court applied 
the Elliott's factors in its determination that compensation paid to the 
corporation's two shareholder-employees was reasonable. This is another case in 
a line of Tax Court decisions which involve a company's executives serving 
multiple roles and functions in order to make its business successful. The court 
attached a great deal of weight to the testimony of the taxpayer's expert witness 
and found it entirely appropriate for the compensation paid to the shareholder-
employees to reflect the combined salaries of the numerous job positions they 
held, including the salaty payments due two co-presidents, a CFO, and the 
managers of sales, credit, purchasing, and warehouse. 1 
Thomas Curtis, MD., Inc. v. Comm'r, TCM 1994-15, involved a professional 
corporation operating within a very specialized niche market: the preparation of 
repmis used in place of medical testimony in worker's compensation cases. The 
issue in the case involved the compensation paid to Ellen Curtis, the chief 
1 See also Universal Manufacturing Co v. Comm 'r, TCM 1994-367; Lumber City Cmp v. Comm 'r, TCM 1996-171; 
and PMT, Inc v. Comm 'r, TCM 1996-303. 
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executive officer of the corporation. In its decision against the taxpayer, the Tax 
Court noted the following: 
• The employee's role in the company is a very important factor. The court 
recognized that Mrs. Curtis' "vision for expansion and ability to constantly 
acquire and subsequently maintain attorney referrals have been of paramount 
importance to the corporation's success." It was also noted that the 
corporation's final medical report, which was the primary focus of Mrs. 
Curtis' efforts, was "the corporation's most effective sales and marketing 
tool." 
• The court analyzed significant data submitted by both parties concerning 
comparable compensation and concluded that the data was not useful due to 
the specialized nature of the corporation's business. The court stated "for the 
evidence of comparable salaries to be awarded any weight, it must be shown 
that such evidence is comparable .... " Furthermore, the court was "not 
satisfied that a reasonable level of compensation for an executive like Mrs. 
Curtis can be accurately determined by reference to the industries ... 
surveyed because of the absence of significant infmmation on businesses 
similar to petitioner's .... Furthermore, evidence of comparable salaries is not 
as useful in the case of a professional service corporation . . . for which the 
best evidence of the value of the services provided is the profit made .... " 
• The success of the business was considered an important factor. The fact that 
the business was "one of the largest and more successful companies of its 
kind" and was "unique among other psychiatric practices" supported the 
compensation paid to Mrs. Curtis. 
• In determining whether the closely held nature of the corporation indicated 
umeasonable compensation, the court considered whether the corporation's 
return of equity would satisfy an independent investor, which was determined 
by dividing net income by the corporation's equity. 
C. T.I. Incorporated v. Comm 'r, TCM 1994-82, involved a corporation providing 
highly specialized electrical engineering services. The corporation paid 
substantial compensation to its president, Edwardo Ca1daron. In allowing most of 
the claimed compensation, the court determined that CTI's success depended on 
the technical skills, background, and expertise of Mr. Caldaron, and stated that 
Mr. Caldm·on was the primary, if not the sole, reason for CTI's success. In 
reaching its decision, the court compared Mr. Caldaron to a professional athlete: 
"His personal efforts, highly-specialized experience, and technical ability 
petmitted CTI to receive these extraordinary revenues during the fiscal year under 
consideration." 
In Mad Auto Wrecking, Inc. v. Comm 'r, TCM 1995-153, the Tax Court allowed as 
reasonable all officers' compensation paid for the years in issue. Mad Auto 
involved a closely-held, high-volume, wholesale scrap business that purchased 
wrecked automobiles and dismantled, sorted, and sold the automobile parts at 
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wholesale. The court found that the corporation operated virtually alone in its 
indust1y due to the unique processes it perfmmed. In applying a Mayson-type 
analysis, the court noted that the shareholder-employees were exceptionally well 
qualified for the taxpayer's operations and were highly motivated individuals. 
The court, consistent with the results of other cases, also found that the 
shareholder-employees performed all of the taxpayer's executive and managerial 
functions and perfmmed or supervised all of its manual labor. In holding for the 
taxpayer, the court noted that the IRS's expert witness presented testimony on the 
reasonableness of the shareholder-employee's compensation which was "not 
based on data from businesses that are akin to the business at hand" and cited 
Boca Construction, L&B Pipe & Supply Co., Thomas A. Curtis. MD., Lumber 
City, PMI, Inc., among others. As the court's opinion makes evident, courts have 
had a consistent problem with expert witnesses attempting to compare "apples to 
oranges" in the context of determining the reasonableness of compensation when 
unique businesses are involved. 
In Boca Construction Inc. v. Comm 'r, TCM 1995-5, the court allowed a deduction 
for all of the compensation paid to the company's two equal shareholders. The 
shareholders were each paid $344,800 in 1989, and $408,750 each in 1990. The 
comi considered twelve factors in making its decision and found that eight factors 
favored the taxpayer, while four were inapplicable to the facts. The factors 
considered by the court were: 
1. The employees' qualifications. 
2. The nature, extent, and scope of the employee's work. The court noted 
that this factor involves the "general importance of the employee to the 
success of the company .... " 
3. Size and complexity of the taxpayer's business. 
4. Comparison of salaries paid with gross and net income. Compensation 
that was consistently around 30% of annual gross receipts was considered 
reasonable. The reasonableness of the compensation was not an issue, 
because company bonuses were tied to the business' profits/performance 
or due to the fact that the bonuses were not formalized in the corporate 
minutes. The court also stated: "Courts may give little or no weight to the 
lack of corporate formality in closely held corporations." 
5. General economic conditions. 
6. Comparison of salaries with distributions to shareholders and retained 
eammgs. 
7. Petitioner's salary policy as to all employees. 
8. Petitioner's financial condition. 
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9. Prevailing rates of compensation for comparable positions in comparable 
companies. This factor was considered inapplicable due to the lack of 
relevant information. 
10. Compensation paid in previous years. 
11. Whether the employee and employer deal at arm's length. The court 
looked at whether an independent investor would approve of the 
compensation paid to the employee. 
12. Whether the employee guaranteed the taxpayer's debt. 
In its decision, the court considered factors (6), (7), (9) and (10) inapplicable to 
the facts of the case. 
In two cases decided at roughly the same time as Boca Construction, courts used 
similar analyses in allowing all of the shareholder-employee's claimed 
compensation. In Comtec Systems, Inc. v. Comm'r, TCM 1995-4, the court 
allowed a deduction for the compensation paid to the corporation's sole 
shareholder during 1988, which totaled $683,368. In Acme Construction Co., Inc. 
v. Comm 'r, TCM 1995-6, the court allowed as a deduction all of the 
compensation paid to the corporation's principal officer during 1990. The officer 
was paid $442,150, consisting of an annual salary of $42,150, and a bonus of 
$400,000. The compensation paid to the officer during 1990 represented a 
significant increase compared to his compensation in prior years. 
In Summit Sheet Metal Co. v. Comm 'r, TCM 1996-563, the court allowed salary 
deductions for all of the compensation paid to three equal shareholders. The 
comi's decision was based on the shareholders' qualifications and the scope of 
their duties, the corporation's size, growth, and financial success, the employee's 
compensation in relation to sales, and the fact that the business performed well 
compared to other comparable firms. In comparing compensation to sales, the 
court noted that prior judicial decisions have held that compensation equal to 43% 
of gross profits was reasonable. 
John L. Ginger Masonry, Inc. v. Comm'r, TCM 1997-251, is a significant case. 
Even though the company in Ginger involved the construction industry, the case 
has several important similarities to Thomas Curtis, which involved a professional 
corporation. These similarities include the following: 
• Both cases involve a successful business in a specialized niche that was 
almost entirely built up by the efforts of a single individual. 
• The individuals in each case performed multiple roles within their businesses, 
including chief executive officer, chief administrative officer, marketing 
executive, etc. Both businesses had a large number of jobs/cases in process 
at one time, and both individuals had primary responsibility for a significant 
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portion of the jobs/cases and supervised the balance. To do this, both 
individuals devoted long hours each year to their businesses. 
• The compensation paid to each individual fluctuated significantly depending 
on the success of the business on an annual basis. In the first year in question 
in Ginger, Mr. Ginger's compensation increased by more than 100% to 
$1,069,001. However, he was paid significantly less in the two subsequent 
years covered by the case. 
• In both cases, no formal dividends were paid by the respective taxpayer. 
• The Tax Court allowed a deduction for all of the compensation paid to Mr. 
Ginger. The court's decision was based on Mr. Ginger's "cmcial role" in the 
business. The comi stated that he "served as the central figure in petitioner's 
growth and success. Ginger effectively discharged the responsibilities of 
several corporate executives." Although the court analyzed a survey of 
financial data conceming compensation paid to others in Mr. Ginger's 
industry, that information had little, if any, influence on the comi's final 
decision. Additionally, the comi placed little significance on the closely held 
nature of the business in stating that: "The mere existence of such a 
relationship, coupled with an absence of dividend payments . . . does not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the amount of compensation is 
unreasonably high." 
In Eberl's Claim Service, Inc. v. Comm 'r, 249 F3d 994 (1Oth Cir 2001 ), the Tenth 
Circuit affirmed the Tax Comi's findings that cetiain shareholder salaries were 
unreasonable. In reaching its decision, the court applied the Mayson factors to the 
facts of the case and refused to adopt the independent investor approach taken by 
Dexsil and Exacto. As a recent judicial interpretation of the reasonableness of 
compensation in the context of the closely held corporation, the court's opinion 
verifies that the traditional, multi-factor Mayson approach to testing 
reasonableness is alive and well in cetiain circuits. 
Reg. §1.162-7(b)(1) and §1.162-8 provide that it is likely that a compensation 
payment is in fact a dividend distribution where excessive payments correspond 
or bear a close relationship to the recipient's stock holdings in the company. The 
"automatic dividend" mle set fotih in Charles McCandless Tile Service v. US., 
422 F.2d 1336, 70-1 USTC ~9284 (Ct. Cl. 1970), was rejected by the Elliotts case 
discussed above as well as by the IRS in Rev. Rul. 79-8. 1979-1 CB 92. Although 
there is no automatic dividend mle, the dividend history of the corporation and 
whether the compensation (bonuses) is paid in proportion to the stock ownership 
of the shareholder-employees are important factors in the multi-factor test. The 
fact that compensation payments are not made in proportion to the shareholder-
employee's stock ownership does not, however, preclude a finding that the 
compensation payment actually constituted a dividend. See Kennedy v. Comm 'r, 
671 F.2d 167, 82-1 USTC ~9186 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'g and remanding, 72 TC 
793 (1979), and Mulcahy, Pauritsch, Salvador & Co., 680 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 
2012). 
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D. REASONABLENESS OF COMPENSATION AND THE INDEPENDENT 
INVESTOR TEST 
1. Background. The Independent Investor Test. In the Elliotts case, the five 
factors used by the court in determining the reasonableness of 
compensation paid by the corporation to its shareholder-employees 
employed an independent investor standard. That standard provides that if 
the corporation's return on equity remains at a level that would satisfy an 
independent investor, there is a strong indication that management is 
providing compensable services and that profits are not being siphoned out 
of the company as disguised salary. This is refened to as the "independent 
investor test." 
2. Dexsil Corp. In Dexsil Cmp. v. Comm 'r, 147 F.3d 96, 98-1 USTC 
~50,471 (2nd Cir. 1998), the Second Circuit vacated and remanded a 
decision of the Tax Court finding umeasonable employee compensation in 
the context of a closely held corporation. In reaching its decision, the 
court quoted its opinion in Rapco Inc. v. Comm 'r, 85 F.3d 950, 96-1 
USTC ~50,297 (2nd Cir. 1996), in stating that "in this circuit the 
independent investor test is not a separate autonomous factor; rather, it 
provides a lens through which the entire analysis should be viewed," 147 
F.3d at 101. The court thus articulated the notion that the independent 
investor tests is more than a mere factor in determining the reasonableness 
of compensation and provides the very basis for assessing reasonableness. 
3. Exacto Spring Corp. Other circuits have adopted the independent 
investor test as set forth by the Second Circuit in Dexsil. In Exacto Spring 
Corp. v. Comm 'r, 196 F.3d 833, 99-2 USTC ~50,964 (7th Cir. 1999), the 
Seventh Circuit held that the salary paid to a shareholder-employee was 
reasonable based on the fact that an independent investor would achieve a 
high rate of return even with the shareholder's salmy. In following the 
Dexsil court's reasoning, Chief Judge Posner stated that "[b]ecause judges 
tend to downplay the element of judicial creativity in adapting law to fresh 
insights and changed circumstances, the cases we have just cited [Dexsil 
and Rapco] prefer to say ... that the 'independent investor' test is the 'lens' 
through which they view the seven ... factors of the orthodox test. But that 
is a fmmality. The new test dissolves the old and returns the inquiry to 
basics." 
E. RECENT CASES DETERMINING REASONABLE COMPENSATION 
1. The Menard Case. In Menard, Inc. v. Comm 'r, 560 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 
2009), the Seventh Circuit reversed the holding of the Tax Court and 
found that the compensation paid by a corporation to its chief executive 
officer constituted reasonable compensation rather than a non-deductible 
dividend distribution to him. 
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Menard, Inc. is a Wisconsin fum that under the name "Menard's" sells 
hardware, building supplies and related products tlu·ough retail stores 
scattered tlu·oughout the Midwest. In 1998, it was the third largest home 
improvement chain in the United States, with only Home Depot and 
Lowe's being larger. It was founded by John Menard in 1962, who 
tlu·ough 1998 was the company's chief executive officer and 
uncontradicted evidence shows him as working 12 to 16 hours a day six or 
seven days a week and only taking seven days of vacation per year. Under 
his management, Menard's revenues grew from $788,000,000 in 1991 to 
$3,400,000,000 in 1998 and the company's taxable income grew from 
$59,000,000 to $315,000,000 during the same time period. The 
company's rate of retum on shareholders' equity in 1998 was, according 
to the IRS's expert, 18.8%, which was higher than the rate of retum on 
shareholders' equity for either Home Depot or Lowe's. 
Mr. Menard owned all of the voting shares in the company and 56% ofthe 
non-voting shares, with the rest of the shares being owned by members of 
his family. In 1998, his sala1y was $157,500, and he received a profit-
sharing bonus of $3,017,100 as well as a "5% bonus" that resulted in Mr. 
Menard receiving an additional $17,467,800. 
The 5% bonus program (5% of the company's net income before income 
taxes) was adopted in 1973 by the company's Board of Directors at the 
suggestion of the company's accounting firm. There was no suggestion 
that any shareholder was disappointed that the company obtained a rate of 
retum of only 18.8% or that the company's success in that year or any 
other year had been due to windfall factors. In addition to finding that Mr. 
Menard's compensation was excessive (primarily based on the 
compensation paid to the chief executive officers of Home Depot and 
Lowe's), the Tax Court found that such amounts were actually intended as 
a dividend. The Tax Court reached this conclusion because Mr. Menard's 
entitlement to his 5% bonus was conditioned on his agreeing to reimburse 
the corporation if the deduction of the bonus from the corporation's 
taxable income was disallowed by the IRS and because 5% of the 
corporate eamings year-in and year-out looked more like a dividend than a 
salary to the Tax Court. As will be discussed in more detail below, the 
Seventh Circuit found that the Tax Court's holding was based on "flimsy 
grounds." 
In reviewing the Tax Court decision, the Seventh Circuit pointed out that a 
corporation is not required to pay dividends. The main focus of the Tax 
Court decision was whether Mr. Menard's compensation exceeded that of 
comparable CEOs in 1998. Specifically, the CEO of Home Depot was 
paid only $2,800,000 in 1998, and the CEO of Lowe's was paid a salary of 
$6,100,000 in 1998 (both of which were considerably less than the total 
compensation paid to Mr. Menard in 1998 of over $20,000,000). 
14 
The Seventh Circuit found that salary is just the beginning of a meaningful 
comparison, because it is only one element of a compensation package. 
Specifically, the Seventh Circuit pointed out that a risky compensation 
structure implies that the executive's salary is likely to vary substantially 
from year to year, and that Mr. Menard's compensation could have been 
considerably less than $20,000,000 if the corporation did not have a good 
year, a possibility the Tax Court completely ignored. Additionally, the 
Seventh Circuit found that the Tax Court did not consider the severance 
packages, retirement plans or other perks of the CEOs when it compared 
Menard with the CEOs of Home Depot and Lowe's. The Seventh Circuit 
also found that the Tax Court's opinion strangely remarked that because 
Mr. Menard owned the company he had all the incentive he needed to 
work hard without the need for a generous salary. The Seventh Circuit 
pointed out that under the Tax Court's reasoning, reasonable 
compensation for Mr. Menard might have been zero. In short, the Seventh 
Circuit found that for compensation purposes, the shareholder-employee 
should be treated like all other employees and that if an incentive bonus is 
appropriate for a non-shareholder employee, there is no reason why a 
shareholder-employee should not be allowed to participate in the same 
manner. Based on these considerations and the fact that an independent 
investor would be satisfied with an 18.8% rate of return, the Seventh 
Circuit concluded that Mr. Menard's compensation was not excessive in 
1998, and that the Tax Court committed clear enor in finding that Mr. 
Menard's compensation was unreasonable. 
2. The Multi-Pak Corp. Case. In Multi-Pak Corp. v. Comm 'r, TCM 2010-
139, the Tax Court held that the compensation paid by the taxpayer's 
wholly owned corporation for one of the years in issue (2002) was 
reasonable, but recharacterized a portion of the compensation paid to the 
taxpayer in the other year in issue (2003) as a non-deductible dividend 
distribution because the amount of compensation paid to the taxpayer in 
that year was unreasonable. 
The taxpayer, Multi-Pak Corp., was a C corporation wholly owned by 
Randall Unthank, who was the president, CEO and COO for the years in 
issue. Mr. Unthank performed all of Multi-Pak's managerial duties and 
made all personnel decisions, and was in charge of Multi-Pak's price 
negotiations, product design, machine design and functionality, and 
administration. Mr. Unthank also personally oversaw the expansion of 
Multi-Pak's office and warehouse in order to accommodate Multi-Pak's 
growing operations. 
In 2002, Multi-Pak paid total compensation of $2,020,000 to Mr. Unthank, 
consisting of a salary of $150,000 and a $1,870,000 bonus. In the other 
year at issue, 2003, Multi-Pak paid a total compensation of $2,058,000 to 
Mr. Unthank, consisting of a salary of $353,000 and a $1,705,000 bonus. 
The IRS determined in a Notice of Deficiency that Multi-Pak could deduct 
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only $665,000 and $660,000 of officer compensation for 2002 and 2003, 
respectively, as reasonable compensation for Mr. Unthank's services 
during those years. Additionally, the IRS imposed Section 6662(a) 
accuracy-related penalties on Multi-Pak for the years in issue. 
In reaching its decision, the court in Multi-Pak discussed and analyzed the 
five categories previously set forth in the Elliotts case: 
a. The employee's role in the company, including as relevant to 
such consideration the position held, hours worked and duties 
peiformed by the employee, in addition to the general importance 
of the employee to the success of the company. In Multi-Pak, the 
Tax Court found that this factor favored the taxpayer based upon 
Mr. Unthank's importance to Multi-Pale. 
b. An extemal comparison of the employee's sa/my with those paid 
by similar companies for similar services. Thus, if a shareholder 
is peJfonning the work of three employees, for example, the 
relevant comparison would be the combined salaries of those 
three employees in a similar corporation. After an extensive 
analysis of the expert testimony presented by the taxpayer and the 
IRS, the Tax Court in Multi-Pak found that the analysis performed 
and the opinions expressed by both parties' experts were not 
persuasive or reliable, and as such, found that the comparison to 
the compensation paid by umelated firms was a neutral factor 
which did not favor either party. 
c. The character and condition of the company as indicated by its 
sales, net income, and capital value, together with the 
complexities of the business, as well as general economic 
conditions. The Tax Court found that although Multi-Pak's net 
income in 2002 and 2003 was low when compared to revenues, 
other factors such as equity, revenue, and gross profit pointed 
towards a successful operation, and as such, found that this factor 
favored the taxpayer. 
d. Whether some relationship exists between the corporation and its 
shareholder-employee which might permit the company to 
disguise nondeductible corporate distributions of income as 
salary expenditures deductible under Section 162(a)(l). This 
category employs the independent investor standard, which 
provides that if the company's return on equity remains at a level 
that would satisfy an independent investor, there is a strong 
indication that management is providing compensable services and 
that profits are not being siphoned out of the company as disguised 
salary. As will be discussed in more detail below, the Tax Court 
found that this factor favored the taxpayer in 2002 but favored the 
IRS in 2003. 
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e. A reasonable, long-standing, consistently applied compensation 
plan is evidence that the compensation paid for the years in 
question is reasonable. The Tax Court found that in 2002 and 
2003, Mr. Unthank paid himself a monthly bonus of $100,000 to 
$250,000 in 19 of the 24 months, in four other instances, Mr. 
Unthank paid himself a bonus of $50,000 or less, and in one other 
instance paid himself a bonus of $375,000. Additionally, Mr. 
Unthank's sons each were paid monthly bonuses that ranged from 
zero to $90,000. Based on all these facts, the Tax Court concluded 
that the taxpayer's payment of Mr. Unthank's bonuses was made 
under a consistent business policy, and as such, this factor favored 
the taxpayer. 
In determining the rate of return which would be received by the 
hypothetical independent investor, the Tax Court in Multi-Pak divided the 
taxpayer's net profit (after payment of compensation and a provision for 
income taxes) by the year-end shareholder's equity as reflected in its 
financial statements. This yielded a return on equity of 2.9% for 2002 and 
negative 15.8% for 2003. The court concluded that although an 
independent investor may prefer to see a higher rate of return than the 
2.9% in 2002, they believed that an independent investor would note that 
Mr. Unthank was the sole reason for the company's significant rise in 
sales in 2002 and would be satisfied with the 2.9% rate of return. 
However, the court agreed with the IRS that a negative 15.8% return on 
equity in 2003 called into question the level of Mr. Unthank's 
compensation for that year. The court went on to state that when 
compensation results in a negative return on shareholder's equity, it 
cannot conclude, in the absence of a mitigating circumstance, that an 
independent investor would be pleased. Consequently, the court felt that 
if Mr. Unthank's salary was reduced to $1,284,104 in 2003, which would 
result in a return on equity of 10% in 2003, that would be sufficient to 
satisfy an independent investor. The court therefore held that taxpayer 
was entitled to deduct the full $2,020,000 paid by it to Mr. Unthank in 
2002 and was entitled to deduct $1,284,104 out of the original 
compensation of $2,058,000 paid to Mr. Unthank in 2003. 
Although the Tax Court did evaluate each of the five factors set forth in 
the Elliotts case, it seemed to rely primarily on the independent investor 
test in reaching its conclusions as to the reasonableness of the 
compensation paid to Mr. Unthank in2002 and 2003. 
Additionally, the court found that the taxpayer reasonably relied upon 
professional advice so as to negate a Section 6662(a) accuracy-related 
penalty because it met each of the following tests: 
(1) The advisor was a competent professional who had 
sufficient expertise to justify reliance; 
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(2) The taxpayer provided necessary and accurate infom1ation 
to the advisor; and 
(3) The taxpayer actually relied in good faith on the advisor's 
judgment. 
(4) Thus, the Tax Court declined to sustain the IRS's 
determination as to the accuracy-related penalty. 
3. The Mulcahy Case - Independent Investor Test Applied to 
Professional Service Corporation. In Mulcahy, Pauritsch, Salvador & 
Co., 680 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 2012), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirming the Tax Comi, held that over $850,000 paid in each of the three 
years in issue to entities owned by each of the founding shareholders of an 
accounting finn operated as a C corporation should be recharacterized as 
nondeductible dividend distributions. The Mulcahy case represents the 
first case in which a comi has applied the so-called "independent investor 
test" in determining reasonable compensation in the professional service 
corporation setting. 
Under the facts of the case, an accounting firm operated as a C 
corporation, had 40 employees located in multiple branches, and, 
according to the comi, had both physical capital and intangible capital (in 
the form of client lists and brand equity). 
Although the corporation had revenues between $5 million to $7 million 
annually, the corporation itself had little or no income because its gross 
revenues were offset by deductions for business expenses, primarily 
compensation paid directly or indirectly to its owner-employees, which 
included three of the finn's accountants whose names form the name of 
the finn and owned more than 80% of the firm's stock (the "Founding 
Shareholders"). The firm reported taxable income of only $11,279 in 
2001, a loss of $53,271 in 2002 and zero taxable income in 2003. In 
addition to the salaries received by the Founding Shareholders that totaled 
$323,076 in 2001, the corporation additionally paid more than $850,000 in 
"consulting fees" for each of the three years in issue to three entities 
owned by the Founding Shareholders, which in tum distributed the money 
to the Founding Shareholders. 
The IRS did not question the salary deductions, but disallowed the 
consulting fees paid to the three entities owned by the Founding 
Shareholders as nondeductible dividends, resulting in a deficiency in 
corporate income tax of more than $300,000 for each of the three years in 
ISSUe. 
The Seventh Circuit found that the accounting firm would flunk the 
independent-investor test if it were to treat the consulting fees as salary 
expenses, since they reduced the firm's income such that the return to a 
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hypothetical equity investor of the corporation would be zero or below 
zero. 
In its decision, the Seventh Circuit found that although the independent 
investor test may not be applicable to the "typical small professional 
services firm," the accounting finn in issue was not a very small fitm 
because of its physical capital, numerous employees and intangible 
capital. Consequently, as stated above, the Seventh Circuit found that the 
Tax Court was correct to reject the fitm's argument that the consulting 
fees were salary expenses because treating such expenses as salary 
reduced the firm's income, and thus the retum to the hypothetical equity 
investor, to zero or below zero. The Seventh Circuit specifically found 
that there was no evidence that the "consulting fees" were compensation 
for the Founding Shareholders' accounting and consulting services, but 
rather were nondeductible dividend distributions. 
The court specifically rejected the firm's argument that since the 
consulting fees were allocated among the Founding Shareholders in 
proportion to the number of hours that each of them worked, rather than 
their stock ownership, those fees could not have been dividends. The 
court stated that whatever the method of allocation of the fitm's income 
(in accordance with stock ownership or othetwise ), if the fees were paid 
out of corporate income -- if every compensated hour included a capital 
retum, the frrm owed corporate income tax on the net income hiding in 
those fees and specifically stated that "a corporation cannot avoid tax by 
using a cockeyed method of distributing profits to its owners."2 
The court went on to state that "remarkably, the firm's lawyers (an 
accounting firm's lawyers) appear not to understand the difference 
between compensation for services and compensation for capital .... " The 
court also noted its puzzlement that the firm chose to organize as a 
conventional business corporation in the first place, and scathingly 
concluded by stating "That an accounting firm should so screw up its 
taxes is the most remarkable feature of the case." 
As demonstrated by the Mulcahy case, it is very difficult, if not 
impossible, for most professional corporations to meet the independent 
investor test where the professional corporation distributes all or 
substantially all of its income in the form of compensation to its 
shareholder-employees (in which case the retum for the independent 
investor would be 0%). The Mulcahy case represents yet another tool in 
the IRS's arsenal for attacking compensation paid to the shareholder-
employees of a professional services corporation. In addition, the IRS has 
the ability to attack compensation paid to the shareholders of a 
2 See also, Kennedy v. Comm 'r, 671 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'g and remanding, 72 TC 793 (1979), where the 
court found that the fact that compensation payments are not made in proportion to the shareholder-employee's 
stock ownership does not preclude a finding that the compensation payment actually constituted a dividend. 
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professional services corporation based on the compensatory intent prong 
of Reg. 1.162-7(a), as demonstrated by Richlands Medical Association, 
TCM 1990-660, and Pediatric Surgical Associates, P.C. TCM 2001-81. 
Based upon the rate changes made by the American Taxpayer Relief Act 
of 2012, the highest marginal combined tax rate applicable to C 
corporation eamings distributed as dividends will be 48%. Additionally, 
note that such eamings are also subject to FICA (Social Security taxes), 
including the new 3.8% Medicare tax imposed on higher eaming 
taxpayers. By taking into account the additional 3.8% Medicare tax, the 
maximum marginal rate on a "C" corporation's eamings distributed as 
dividends to its shareholders will be 50.47%.3 
4. Thousand Oaks Residential Care Home I, Inc. In Thousand Oaks 
Residential Care Home L Inc. v. Comm 'r, TCM 2013-10, the Tax Court, 
applying the five factor test set forth in the Elliotts case, as well as the 
independent investor test, disallowed a large portion of the compensation 
paid to the shareholders of a C corporation. 
In Thousand Oaks, the taxpayers (Mr. and Mrs. Fletcher) owned and 
operated an assisted living facility for a number of years prior to selling 
the assisted living facility to a third party. Following the sale, the 
taxpayers continued to be employed at the assisted living facility by the 
new owner. For the years in issue, 2003, 2004 and 2005, the corporation 
paid Mr. Fletcher W -2 wages of $200,000, $200,000, and $30,000, 
respectively. Additionally, the corporation contributed $191,433 and 
$259,506 to a pension plan for the benefit of Mr. Fletcher in 2003 and 
2004, respectively, for a total compensation package of $880,939. The 
corporation paid Mrs. Fletcher W-2 wages of $200,000, $200,000 and 
$30,000, for 2003, 2004 and 2005, respectively. Additionally, the 
corporation contributed $191,433 and $198,915 to a pension plan for the 
benefit of Mrs. Fletcher in 2003 and 2004, respectively, for a total 
compensation package of $820,348. The Board of Director minutes for 
the years in issue stated that the compensation to the taxpayers was 
approved for payment of back salaries that were not paid in prior years 
due to insufficient cash flow. 
The IRS contended that the compensation packages paid to the taxpayers 
were not reasonable for the 2003, 2004 and 2005 tax years and disallowed 
the deductions for all of the compensation. The taxpayers, on the other 
hand, argued that the compensation paid in those years was reasonable and 
included "catch-up" payments for prior years in which they were under-
compensated. 
3 See Looney and Levitt, "Operation of the Professional Corporation 2010: Reasonable Compensation Issues," for 
Professional and Other Service Businesses, proceedings of the New York University 69th Institute on Federal 
Taxation, May 2011. 
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In its decision, the Tax Court did find that compensation for prior years 
services is deductible in the current year so long as the employee was 
actually undercompensated in prior years and the current payments are 
intended for past services. Additionally, the Tax Court stated that when 
the compensation was actually for prior years of service, it does not need 
to be reasonable in the year it is actually paid. 
The Tax Court then went through an analysis of the five broad factors set 
fmih in the Elliotts case. The Tax Court also specifically stated that in the 
Ninth Circuit, where an appeal in the taxpayers' case would lie, the 
independent investor test must also be taken into account. After analyzing 
the five factors set forth in the Elliotts case, the Tax Court then focused on 
the independent investor test. Citing a number of cases, the Tax Comi 
found that a return on investment of between 10% and 20% tends to 
indicate compensation was reasonable. In particular, it stated that because 
the corporation in issue was a small highly leveraged business purchased 
with a large amount of debt, a hypothetical investor might be satisfied 
with a 10% return on his investment. Consequently, the Tax Court, taking 
into account a 10% rate of return, backed into the reasonable 
compensation to which the taxpayers were entitled, and disallowed a total 
of $282,615 of compensation paid to them. This should be contrasted with 
the Aries case discussed above which also found a return of 10%-20% 
reasonable, but still found a portion of the compensation in that case to be 
unreasonable based on the application of the multi-factor test. 
5. K&K Veterinary Supply. In K&K Veterinary Supply v. Comm 'r, TCM 
2013-84, the Tax Comi, siding with the IRS's expert, recharacterized a 
pmiion of the salaries paid to the sole shareholder of a C corporation and 
to other members of his family, as well as rental payments made by the 
Corporation to another entity wholly owned by the shareholder, as non-
deductible dividends. 
The C corporation was a wholesale distributor of animal health products 
for large animals, swine, sheep, goats and horses; lawn and garden 
products; farm hardware; pet supplies; and products for farm stores and 
related dealers. The corporation was wholly owned by Jay Lipsmeyer, 
who served as president, co-chief executive officer and co-chief operating 
officer of the corporation. His wife, Melissa Lipsmeyer, served as vice 
president, secretary, and assistant chief financial officer of the corporation, 
while his brother, David Lipsmeyer, served as the corporation's senior 
vice president of sales and co-chief executive and co-chief operating 
officer). Jay Lipsmeyer's daughter, Jennifer Stewart, served as the 
corporation's chief financial officer. 
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In a departure from some recent opinions applying the so-called 
"independent investor" test,4 the comi, in determining reasonable 
compensation, applied the so-called multi-factor test to determine 
reasonable compensation for the officers of the corporation, rather than the 
so-called "independent investor" test. Citing Charles Snyder & Co. v. 
Comm 'r, 500 F2d 48 (8th Cir. 1974), aff'g TCM 1973-130, the court 
stated that various factors should be considered in determining the 
reasonableness of compensation, such as: (1) the employee's 
qualifications, (2) the nature, extent and scope of the employee's work, (3) 
the size and complexity of the business, (4) prevailing general economic 
conditions, (5) the employee's compensation as a percentage of gross and 
net income, (6) the employee-shareholder's compensation compared with 
distributions to shareholders, (7) the employee-shareholder's 
compensation compared with that paid to non-shareholder employees, (8) 
prevailing rates of compensation for comparable positions in comparable 
concerns, and (9) comparison of compensation paid to a particular 
shareholder-employee in previous years where the corporation has a 
limited number of officers. The comi additionally stated that special 
scrutiny must be given to situations where a corporation is controlled by 
the employees to whom the compensation is paid because there is a lack of 
arms-length bargaining. 
In reaching its decision, the Tax Court evaluated all of these factors, and 
looked primarily to the testimony given by the expert witnesses. After 
considering the repmis of the taxpayer's expert and the IRS's expert, the 
court found the IRS expeti's report persuasive and accepted his 
conclusions as to reasonable compensation for each of the officers for the 
years in issue, 2006 and 2007, which resulted in the balance of the 
compensation being treated as non-deductible dividend distributions to the 
sole shareholder. 
The court then considered the deductibility of the rental payment made by 
the corporation to the related entity owned by the sole shareholder of the 
corporation. The court stated that in detetmining whether the payments in 
issue were rental payments deductible under Section 162(a)(3), the "basic 
question is . . . whether they were in fact rent rather than something else 
paid under the guise of rent."5 Again, the taxpayer had his own expert as 
to whether the rental payments were reasonable and the IRS had its own 
expert testify as to whether the rental payments were reasonable. Once 
again, the court accepted the position taken by the IRS's expert as to 
reasonable rent, and treated the balance of the rental payments as non-
deductible dividends to the sole shareholder of the corporation. 
4 See, e.g., Menard Inc. v. Comm'r, 560 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2009); Multi-Pak Cmp. v. Comm'r, TCM 2010-139; 
Mulcahy, Pauritsch, Salvador & Co. v. Comm 'r, 680 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 2012); and Thousand Oaks Residential Care 
Home I, Inc. v. Comm 'r, TCM 2013-10. 
5 Place v. Comm 'r, TC 199 (1951), aff'd per curium 199 F2d 373 (6th Cir. 1952). 
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6. Aries Communication, Inc. In Aries Communication, Inc. v. Comm 'r, 
TCM 2013-97, the Tax Court held that the compensation paid to a 
communications corporation's sole shareholder was unreasonable and 
upheld an accuracy-related penalty. The tax year at issue is the fiscal year 
ending August 31, 2004. 
The case involved compensation paid to N. Atihur Astor (Astor), the 
president, CEO, CFO, and sole shareholder of Aries Communications Inc. 
in his capacity as general manager of a number of radio stations owned by 
At·ies and its subsidiaries, Orange Broadcasting Corp. and North County 
Broadcasting (collectively, At·ies). Astor had worked in radio 
broadcasting in various capacities for 60 years. As the key employee and 
hands-on owner-operator, Astor made decisions regarding personnel, 
programming, sales, and acquiring and maintaining FCC licenses, and he 
negotiated directly with lenders and outside advisors. 
Astor's personal services also included negotiating purchases and sales of 
individual radio stations, resulting in prices far exceeding the buyers' 
original offers (e.g., increased to $18 million from $12 million). Astor 
personally guaranteed a $20 million loan for Aries, which precipitated the 
sales of two radio stations as part of a forbearance agreement with the 
lender. There were a number of interparty loans between Astor and At·ies. 
Between the years 1992 and 2002, Aries was losing increasing amounts of 
money. It sold a radio station in each of the years 2003 and 2004 and was 
profitable in those years; however, Aries began losing money again in the 
succeeding years. 
For the year at issue, fiscal year 2004, the IRS disallowed $6,086,752 of 
Aries' claimed Section 162 deduction for compensation paid to Astor, and 
detetmined a deficiency of $2,676,002 and a Section 6662(a) accuracy-
related penalty of $535,200.40. Aries petitioned the Tax Comi and argued 
in pati that the amount paid to Astor in fiscal year 2004 included catch-up 
amounts for the three prior years; thus, the comi evaluated the 
reasonableness of Astor's compensation for FY 2001 through FY 2004. 
The comi determined that there is no doubt that Astor was the most 
valuable employee of At·ies, and that at least a portion of the compensation 
paid to him was for services actually rendered. 
To determine whether the compensation was reasonable, the court applied 
the five factors enunciated by the court in Elliotts: 
1. The employee's role in the company. 
2. A comparison of the employee's salary with salaries paid by 
similar companies for similar services. 
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3. The character and condition of the company. 
4. Potential conflicts of interest. 
5. Intemal consistency. 
The court also applied an additional factor: Whether an independent 
investor would be willing to compensate the employee as the taxpayer 
compensated the employee, based on all the facts and circumstances. 
With respect to the first factor (the employee's role in the company), the 
court determined that Astor was a hands-on owner-operator actively 
involved in managing many aspects of Aries' day-to-day operations. His 
business acumen and experience resulted in successful investments for 
Aries, including acquisition of FCC licenses and the successful sales of 
two radio stations. The first factor thus weighed in favor of Aries. 
For the second factor (comparison with similar companies' salaries), the 
parties provided experts with divergent opinions regarding reasonable 
compensation. Aries provided two experts and the IRS provided one 
expert, each of which used linear regression as a tool to compare industry 
income and compensation. The experts agreed that extemal comparisons 
were difficult because Aries was one of the few companies in the industry 
in which the owner was also the operator, and that Astor was underpaid 
during the four years evaluated by the court. The experts also agreed that 
Astor's salary was underpaid in previous years, and the court averaged 
their conclusions. However, the expe1is disagreed regarding the 
reasonableness of the $6,697,700 bonus paid to Astor during the year at 
issue. The court, using its judgment and based on the evidence in the 
record, dete1mined that an appropriate bonus would be $2 million. This 
factor weighed against Aries. 
For the third factor (character and condition of the company), the court 
found that Aries was a large asset-laden complex business holding 
multiple subsidiaries, each with its own radio station. The court noted that 
Aries lost money in all years except the years it sold radio stations, that it 
was deeply in debt, and that it had to borrow money from Astor even 
during the year it paid him the bonus at issue. The comi concluded that 
this bleak financial situation suggested that Aries was thinly capitalized, 
and cast a shadow on the substance of the transaction. This factor also 
weighed against Alies. 
The fourth factor (potential conflicts of interest) concems whether a 
relationship exists between the employee and the company that may 
pe1mit the disguise of nondeductible corporate distributions as salary 
expenditures. Noting a lack of specific evidence in the record regarding 
whether Aries had ever paid dividends to Astor, the comi determined that 
such a relationship did exist. Also, the various related-party loans and 
24 
Astor's personal guarantee of the $20 million debt made it difficult to 
discem the true capital structure and equity status of the corporate entities. 
Further, although Astor negotiated the highest price for the sale of the 
radio station, just as an independent investor would, he had significant 
interest in receiving the reward as deductible salary instead of a 
nondeductible dividend. This factor again weighed against Aries. 
The court found the fifth factor (intemal consistency) to be neutral. The 
court found the amount of Astor's bonus to be "suspect" because it was 
not paid under a structured formal plan and was determined the end of the 
year when Aries' profits and potential income tax liabilities could be 
predicted. However, no employees within the corporation had comparable 
duties, and the compensation included amounts for prior years of hard 
work for which he was undercompensated. 
Finally, with respect to the additional factor (the independent investor), the 
court considered what a reasonable retum on investment for a hypothetical 
independent shareholder would be. Citing case law, the court determined 
that a retum on investment of 10%-20% tends to indicate compensation is 
reasonable. Aries was a highly leveraged business but possessed assets, 
such as the FCC licenses, that were likely to appreciate. Further, it was 
unclear from the record what Astor's initial investment was and the 
interparty loans made it difficult to determine the retum on investment. 
Nevertheless, the court's review of Aries' net income after paying 
compensation revealed that retained eamings would have been almost 
enough to satisfy an independent investor at 20%. This factor weighed in 
favor of Aries. 
Based on all the facts and circumstances, the court concluded that Astor's 
compensation was unreasonable for the year at issue, and not deductible to 
Aries in its entirety. The court computed an amount that was deductible, 
based on the average underpaid salaries for previous years plus the actual 
fixed salaty, and a $2 million bonus that was determined reasonable for 
the year at issue. Regarding the Section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty, 
the court noted that Aries did not provide any evidence of reasonable 
cause; accordingly, the penalty was upheld. 
If this case had been decided exclusively under the independent investor 
test discussed below, which many courts have more recently favored, it 
would appear that a different result would have been reached in Aries and 
all of the compensation would have been treated as reasonable 
compensation. 
7. Independent Investor Test Being Used More Frequently. Based upon 
a number of these recent cases, including the Menard,6 Multi-Pak./ 
6 560 F3d 620 (7th Cir 2009). 
7 TCM 2010-139. 
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Mulcahy, Pauritsch, Salvador & Co.8 and Thousand Oaks9 cases, the 
comis seem to be putting more emphasis on the independent investor test 
(than the multi-factor test) in determining the reasonableness of 
compensation. 
III. EMPLOYMENT TAX ISSUES 
A. THE SELF -EMPLOYMENT TAX 
For 2014, the self-employment tax ("SE Tax") can be a significant burden on 
taxpayers as it is imposed on net eamings from self-employment ("NESE") at the 
rate of 15.3% on the first $117,000 of such net eamings, and 2.9% on amounts in 
excess of $117,000. (Section 1402(a)). Excluded from the definition of NESE 
are certain capital gains, rental income, interest and dividends. Because 
individuals are entitled to an above the line deduction equal to one-half of the SE 
Tax paid under Section 164(f), the effective tax rate for the SE Tax is somewhat 
reduced. Among the factors to be considered in choosing the form of business 
entity that will be used to operate a closely-held business is the applicability of the 
SE tax on an owner's share of income from the business entity. 
B. HEALTH CARE AND EDUCATION RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010 
The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of2010, H.R. 4872, P.L. 111-
152, imposes a new tax on uneamed income on partners, members ofLLCs taxed 
as partnerships and S corporation shareholders. Specifically, Section 1411(a)(1) 
imposes a 3.8% tax on the lesser of (a) "net investment income" or (b) the excess 
of modified adjusted gross income over $250,000 in the case of taxpayers filing a 
joint retum and over $200,000 for other taxpayers. Under Section 1411(c)(A)(i), 
"net investment income" includes gross income from interest, dividends, 
annuities, royalties, and rents other than such income which is derived in the 
ordinary course of a trade or business. Consequently, items of interest, dividends, 
annuities, royalties, and rents which pass through a partnership, LLC or S 
corporation to its partners, members or shareholders, will retain their character as 
net investment income and will be subject to the new 3.8% net investment income 
tax. 
Additionally, the term "net investment income" includes: (1) any other gross 
income derived from a trade or business if such trade or business is a passive 
activity within the meaning of Section 469, with respect to the taxpayer; and (2) 
any net gain (to the extent taken into account in computing taxable income) 
attributable to the disposition of propetiy other than property held in a trade or 
business that is not a passive activity under Section 469 with respect to the 
taxpayer. 
8 680 F3d 867 (7th Cir 2012). 
9 TCM 2013-10. 
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Consequently, a patiner, including a limited partner, LLC member and an S 
corporation shareholder, will be subject to the new 3.8% net investment income 
tax on his or her distributive share of the operating income of the partnership, 
LLC or S corporation, as the case may be, if the activity generating such income 
is passive under Section 469 with respect to such partner, LLC member or S 
corporation shareholder. 
The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 also increased the 
Medicare portion of the FICA tax by .9% (to 3.8%) on wages in excess of 
$250,000 in the case of taxpayers filing a joint retum and more than $200,000 for 
other taxpayers, as well as the Medicare pmiion of the self-employment tax by 
.9% (to 3.8%) on eamings from self-employment in excess of $250,000 in the 
case of taxpayers filing a joint retum and more than $200,000 for other taxpayers. 
The new 3.8% tax provisions are effective for tax years beginning after January 
31,2012. 
C. SOLE PROPRIETORSHIPS 
Clearly, individuals eaming income as sole proprietors (either as a sole 
proprietorship or a single member LLC which is treated as a disregarded entity 
under the Check-the-Box Regulations) from a trade or business are generally 
required to treat such ordinaty income from that trade or business as NESE. 
D. PARTNERSHIPS 
The SE Tax treatment of general patiners is generally understood: each general 
partner must include as NESE his distributive share of ordinary income (other 
than the excluded interest, rent and dividends). Section 1402(a)(13) excludes 
from NESE a limited patiner's distributive share of partnership income (other 
than distributions that are guaranteed payments or compensation for services to 
the extent that those payments are established to be in the nature of remuneration 
for those services to the partnership). Accordingly, a general partner's 
distributive share of income from the partnership normally will be treated as 
NESE, while a limited partner's distributive share of income from the partnership 
normally will not be treated as NESE. The legislative history of Section 1402 
makes clear that this exception for limited partners was intended to prevent 
passive investors, who do not perform services, from obtaining social security 
coverage or coverage under qualified retirement plans. One troubling issue 
relates to the application of the SE Tax with respect to a limited partner who also 
serves as a general partner in a partnership. Section 1402's legislative history 
reflects an intent to apply these rules separately to limited partnership and general 
partnership interests, even if held by the same partner. The lack of legislative or 
regulatory clarity has caused the application of rules for limited patiners to be 
difficult. 
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E. LLCs TAXED AS PARTNERSIDPS 
While multi-member LLCs (which do not elect to be treated as associations 
taxable as corporations) are treated as patinerships for tax purposes under the 
Check-the-Box Regulations, the SE Tax issues relating to LLCs and their 
members are at best unclear. The question to be addressed is whether members of 
such LLCs (taxed as partnerships) would be treated as limited partners under 
Section 1402(a)(l3), so that their distributive share of LLC income and loss 
relating to their LLC interest is exempt from SE Tax. 
On its face, the language of Section 1402(a)(l3) would only exclude from NESE 
the distributive share of income of a limited partner of a partnership. Under such 
a literal reading, the distributive share of income of any other type or class of 
partner in the patinership would be considered NESE. Rev. Rul. 58-166, 1958-1 
C.B. 224, held that the taxpayer's earnings from a worldng interest in an oil lease 
was NESE despite the fact that he had limited involvement in the organization. 
2. The 1994 Proposed Regulations. With the advent of LLC statutes in the 
early 1990's and thereafter, the IRS attempted to address theSE Tax issue 
with respect to members of LLCs through the promulgation of Prop. Reg. 
§1.1402(a)-18 (the "1994 Regulations"). Under the 1994 Regulations, a 
member of a member-managed LLC would have been treated as a limited 
patiner for purposes of Section 1402(a)(l3) if: (i) the member was not a 
manager of the LLC; (ii) the LLC could have been formed as a limited 
partnership (rather than as an LLC in the same jurisdiction); and (iii) the 
member could have qualified as a limited partner in that limited 
patinership under applicable law. 
Accordingly, for manager-managed LLCs, whether a non-manager 
member's share of the LLC' s income would be considered NESE turned 
on whether such member's interest could have been characterized as a 
limited partnership interest had the LLC been formed as a limited 
partnership. This factual determination often proved to be unworkable 
and depended on several factors, including the amount of the member's 
participation in the LLC 's business operations and the provisions of the 
LLC Act and Limited Partnership Act of the applicable state. 
3. The 1997 Proposed Regulations. The next attempt by the IRS to address 
the application of the SE Tax to members of an LLC were the 1997 
proposed regulations. Prop. Reg. §1.1402-2(h) defines a "limited partner" 
for purposes of the SE Tax as an individual holding an interest in an entity 
classified as a federal tax partnership unless one of the following 
exceptions applies: 
a. The individual has personal liability for the debt of or claims 
against the partnership by reason of being a partner. For this 
purpose, an individual has personal liability if the creditor of the 
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entity may seek satisfaction of all or any portion of the debts or 
claims against the entity from such individual. 
b. The individual has authority under the law of the jurisdiction in 
which the partnership is formed to contract on behalf of the 
partnership. 
c. The individual pmiicipates in the partnership's trade or business 
for more than 500 hours during the partnership's tax year. 
Additionally, there are three exceptions to the general rule set forth in 
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402-2(h), as follows: 
(1) Under the first exception, an individual who holds more 
than one class of interest in a partnership and who is not a 
limited partner under the general definition, may still be 
treated as a limited partner with respect to a specific class 
of interest. This exception is satisfied if immediately after 
the individual acquires the class of interest: (1) persons 
who are limited partners under the general definition own a 
substantial continuing interest in the class of interest; and 
(2) the individual's rights and obligations with respect to 
that class of interest are identical to the rights and 
obligations of the specific class held by the partners of that 
class who satisfy the general definition of a limited partner. 
Whether the interests of the limited partners in the specific 
class under the general definition are substantial is 
determined based on all of the relevant facts and 
circumstances. There is a safe harbor under which 20% or 
greater ownership of the specific class is considered 
substantial. The proposed regulations define class of 
interest as an interest that grants the holder specific rights 
and obligations. A separate class exists if the holder's 
rights and obligations attributable to an interest are 
different from another holder's rights and obligations. The 
existence of a guaranteed payment to an individual for 
services rendered to the partnership is not a factor in 
detetmining the rights and obligations of a class of interest. 
(2) The second exception applies to an individual who holds 
only one class of interest. Under this exception, an 
individual who cannot meet the general definition of 
limited partner because he or she participates in the partner-
ship's trade or business for more than 500 hours during the 
pminership's tax year is treated as a limited pminer if: (1) 
persons who are limited partners under the general 
definition own a substantial continuing interest in the class 
of interest; and (2) an individual's rights and obligations 
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with respect to that class of interest are identical to the 
rights and obligations of that specific class held by persons 
who satisfy the general definition of a limited partner. 
(3) The third exception applies to a service partner in a service 
partnership and provides that regardless of whether the 
individual can satisfy the general definition of a limited 
patiner under one of the above-described exceptions, that 
individual may not be treated as a limited partner. A 
partnership is a service partnership if substantially all of its 
activities involve the performance of services in the fields 
of health, law, engineering, architecture, accounting, 
actuarial science, or consulting. A service partner is a 
partner who provides services to or on behalf of the service 
partnership's trade or business unless that individual's 
services are de minimis. 
4. The Moratorium. Immediately following the issuance of the 1997 
regulations, significant protests were made. As a result of this significant 
protest, Congress enacted Section 935 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, 
Pub. L. No. 105-34, which prohibited the issuance or effectiveness of 
temporary or final regulations with respect to the definition of a limited 
partner under Section 1402(a)(l3) prior to July 1998. Although the 
moratorium period has long since passed, no guidance on the definition of 
a limited partner for self-employment tax purposes under Section 
1402(a)(l3) has been issued to date. 
Accordingly, as a result of the moratorium, there is a dearth of authority 
with respect to the SE Tax treatment of an LLC member's distributive 
share of an LLC's income. The only available guidance in existence are 
several private letter rulings that hold that a member is a patiner and that a 
member's distributive share of partnership income is not excepted from 
NESE by Section 1402(a )(13). 10 
While the Congress and the Treasury seem to have reached a deadlock on 
the self-employment tax issue involving partnerships, the American Bar 
Association Taxation Section and the AICP A Tax Division developed a 
legislative proposal to treat members of LLCs that are taxed as 
partnerships in the same manner as partners of palinerships generally. 
Simply put, under this proposal, income attributable to capital would be 
excluded from NESE and income attributable to services would be 
included. The effect of the proposal is to adopt two safe harbors for 
determining income attributable to capital, one on an interest-base retum 
of capital, the other on an exclusion for amounts in excess of reasonable 
10 See Ltr. Ruls. 9432018, 9452024 and 9525058. 
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compensation for services rendered. This legislative proposal was 
submitted to Congressman Bill Archer by Paul Sachs on July 6, 1999. 11 
Interestingly, on June 10, 2003, Lucy Clark, a national tax issue specialist 
in the IRS's examination specialization program, stated that taxpayers may 
rely on the 1997 regulations. Specifically, she said that "if the taxpayer 
conforms to the latest set of proposed rules, we generally will not 
challenge what they do or don't do with regard to self-employment 
taxes."12 
5. The Thompson Case. In Thompson v. US., 87 F. Cl. 728 (2009), the 
United States Court of Federal Claims held that an LLC member could 
not be treated the same as a limited partner for purposes of meeting the 
material participation rules under the passive activity loss limitation rules 
of Section 469. 
The taxpayer-member formed Mountain Air Charter, LLC ("Mountain 
Air") under the laws of the state of Texas. The taxpayer directly owned a 
99% membership interest in Mountain Air and indirectly held the 
remaining 1% through an S corporation. Mountain Air's Articles of 
Organization designate the taxpayer-member as its only manager. 
Because Mountain Air did not elect to be treated as a corporation for 
federal income tax purposes, by default it was taxed as a partnership. 13 On 
his 2002 and 2003 individual income tax returns, the taxpayer-member 
claimed Mountain Air's losses of $1,225,869 and $939,870, respectively. 
The IRS disallowed the losses because it believed that the taxpayer did not 
materially participate in the business operations of Mountain Air. 
Specifically, the IRS rested its conclusion on Reg. § 1.469-ST, which sets 
forth the tests for what constitutes taxpayer material patiicipation for 
purposes of applying the passive activity loss limitation rules of Section 
469. The IRS found that Reg. § 1.469-ST "explicitly treats interests in any 
entity which limits liability as limited partnership interests." Because the 
taxpayer enjoyed limited liability as a member of his limited liability 
company (Mountain Air), the IRS concluded that the taxpayer's interest 
was identical to a limited partnership interest. The taxpayer, on the other 
hand, argued that his membership interest should not be treated as a 
limited partnership interest for purposes of the passive activity loss 
limitation rules. The classification of a membership interest in an LLC as 
a "limited partnership interest" is important because a limited patiner has 
fewer means by which he can demonstrate his material participation in the 
business. The parties specifically stipulated that if the taxpayer's 
membership interest is a limited partnership interest, then the taxpayer 
cannot demonstrate his material participation in the LLC and Section 469 
11 See Tax Notes, July 19, 1999, at 469. 
12 BNA's Daily Tax Report (Friday June 13, 2003), G-3. 
13 Reg. §301.7701-3(b)(1)(i). 
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will limit his losses. Likewise, the parties also stipulated that if the 
taxpayer's membership interest is not a limited partnership interest, then 
the taxpayer can demonstrate his material participation in the LLC and 
Section 469 does not limit his losses. 
The taxpayer simply argued that his interest should not be treated as a 
limited partnership interest because Mountain Air was not a limited 
partnership. The IRS, on the other hand, argued that it was proper to treat 
the taxpayer's interest in Mountain Air as a limited partnership interest 
because the taxpayer elected to have Mountain Air taxed as a partnership 
for federal income tax purposes and the taxpayer's liability was limited 
under the laws of the state in which it was organized (Texas). 
Based on the plain language of both the statute and the regulations, the 
court concluded that in order for an interest to be classified as a limited 
partnership interest the ownership interest must be in an entity that is, in 
fact, a partnership under state law and not merely taxed as such under the 
Code. Specifically, the court stated that once Reg. § 1.469-ST( e )(3) is read 
in context and with due regard to its text, stmcture, and purpose, it 
becomes abundantly clear that it is simply inapplicable to a membership 
interest in an LLC. 
Furthermore, the court found that even if Reg. § 1.469-5T( e )(3) could 
apply to the taxpayer and the court had to categorize his membership 
interest as either a limited or general partnership interest, it would best be 
categorized as a general partner's interest under Reg. § 1.469-5T( e )(3 )(ii) 
since a member in an LLC can actively participate in the management of 
the LLC (unlike limited partners of a limited partnership). 
6. IRS Action on Decision. In Action on Decision2010-14, IRB 515 (April 
5, 2010), the IRS announced its acquiescence in result only in Thompson. 
In addition to Thompson, Garnett v. Comm 'r, 132 TC 19 (2009), Gregg v. 
US., 186 F.Supp.2d 1123 (D. Or. 2000), and Newell v. Comm 'r, TCM 
2010-23, have allmled against the IRS's position that an interest in an 
LLC is a limited partnership interest under Reg. § 1.469-5T( e )(3)(i). 
According to Diana Miosi, special counsel in the IRS Office of Associate 
Chief Counsel (Passthroughs and Special Industries), the AOD was issued 
"to get the word out that we're not going to be litigating these cases 
anymore." Ms. Miosi's remarks were made on March 10, 2010 at a BNA 
Tax Management luncheon. Additionally, Miosi stated that the string of 
litigation losses has "gotten our attention," and that "it is important to tty 
to get some guidance out in this area." Finally, Miosi noted that the 
govermnent has stmggled with the issue, not only with respect to Section 
469, but also in other areas of the Code as well, such as Sections 464 and 
736, and the self-employment tax area. 
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The distinction between membership interests in limited liability 
companies and limited partnership interests in limited pminerships will be 
of even greater significance because the new net investment income tax 
imposed on a partner's distributive share of the operating income of a 
partnership if the activity of the partnership producing the income is 
passive with respect to the partner under the passive activity loss 
limitation rules of Section 469. 
7. Implication of Thompson Case on Self-Employment Tax to LLC 
Members. The issue of whether the members of a multi-member LLC 
which is taxed as a pa1inership for federal income tax purposes are treated 
as general partners or limited partners for purposes of the self-employment 
tax is unclear at best. Obviously, the IRS could use the same reasoning 
used against the IRS in the Thompson, Garnett, Newell and Gregg cases to 
reach the conclusion that a member's interest in the LLC is not equivalent 
to a limited pminer's interest in a limited partnership for purposes of self-
employment tax. This would result in members of an LLC being subject 
to the self-employment tax on their distributive share of the income of an 
LLC (with certain exceptions for interest, dividends, rent and capital gain). 
However, on January 14, 2010, Diana Miosi reassured practitioners that 
they may rely on the proposed 1997 regulations in dealing with the 
application of the self-employment tax to limited liability companies. See 
TNT, Jan. 15, 2010. 
8. The Robucci Case. In Robucci v. Comm 'r, TCM 2011-19, the Tax Comi 
applied the two-pronged Moline Properties (Moline Properties v. Comm 'r, 
319 U.S. 436, 30 AFTR 1291 (1943)) test to disregard two corporations 
created by a psychiatrist (on the advice of his attorney/ accountant) for the 
purpose of reducing his tax liabilities. The court also imposed an 
accuracy-related penalty under Section 6662(a) for a substantial 
understatement of income tax. 
The taxpayer met with his advisor to explore the benefits of incorporating 
his practice, including minimizing taxes. The taxpayer's advisor, who was 
an attorney and certified public accountant (CPA), had an accounting 
practice that specialized in small businesses. "Choice of entity planning" 
for those businesses was a significant pmi of the advisor's practice. 
The taxpayer's advisor recommended an organizational structure designed 
to transfmm the taxpayer's sole proprietorship into a limited liability 
company (LLC) classified as a partnership for federal income tax purposes 
with the intent of reducing self-employment tax. In particular, the LLC 
would have two members: the taxpayer, who would have a 95% interest, 
and a newly incorporated personal corporation ("Robucci P.C."), which 
was designated the manager of the LLC with a 5% interest. The 
taxpayer's 95% interest was split between an 85% interest as a limited 
partner and a 10% interest as a general partner. The case does not explain 
how the LLC could have partners classified as "general pminers" and 
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"limited partners." It is unclear why the advisor didn't use a single limited 
partnership as the choice of entity for the taxpayer. The 85% limited 
partner interest allegedly represented goodwill, the value of which was 
determined by the taxpayer's advisor but unsupported by any 
documentation. A second corporation ("W estphere") was fmmed for the 
purpose of providing services in connection with the taxpayer's practice, 
including its management and tracking its expenses and to creating a 
group eligible for medical insurance. W estphere charged the LLC 
"management fees" for its alleged services. 
The taxpayer's advisor provided no written explanation of the reason for 
creating three entities and he never discussed with the taxpayer the basis 
for the 85%/10% split between his "limited" and "general" partnership 
interests. The taxpayer did not seek a second opinion from any other CPA 
or attorney assessing the merits of his advisor's recommendations. There 
was no valuation in support of the 85% limited partnership interest issued 
for intangibles, nor was there a written assignment of the tangible or 
intangible assets of the taxpayer's medical practice to the LLC. 
The taxpayer paid self-employment tax only on net income allocated to 
him as general partner (i.e., 10% ofLLC's net income), whereas, as a sole 
proprietor, he was required to pay self-employment tax on the entire net 
income from his psychiatric practice. See Sections 1401 and 1402. 
The comi analyzed the facts under the two-prong test of Moline 
Properties. Under this test, a corporation is recognized as a separate legal 
entity if either: 
(1) The purpose of its formation is the equivalent of business 
activity. 
(2) The incorporation is followed by the carrymg on of a 
business by the corporation. 
Under the first prong, the court found that both Robucci P.C. and 
Westphere were formed solely to reduce the taxpayer's tax liability and 
not with a business purpose (i.e., there was no equivalent of business 
activity on corporate formation). With respect to Westphere, the court 
concluded that its only activity was the equivalent of "taking money from 
one pocket and putting it into another." Under the second prong of the 
Moline Properties test, the court found that both Robucci P.C. and 
Westphere "were, essentially, hollow corporate shells," which lead to the 
conclusion that "neither carried on a business after incorporation." Thus, 
the court disregarded both corporations. 
Because Robucci P.C. was disregarded for tax purposes, the court found 
that the LLC had only one owner, the taxpayer. Because no election was 
made to classify the LLC as a corporation, the LLC was disregarded and 
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its owner was treated as a sole proprietor. Consequently, the taxpayer was 
treated as a sole proprietor for federal tax purposes, which was his status 
before formation of the three entities. See Reg.§§ 301.7701-1 through -3. 
9. The Renkemeyer Case. In Renkemeyer, Campbell & Weaver, LLP v. 
Comm 'r, 136 TC 137 (2011), the Tax Court disallowed a law firm's 
special allocation of business income and held that the firm's attomey 
partners were liable for self-employment tax on allocations of partnership 
income related to the law finn's legal practice. 
Renkemeyer, Campbell & Weaver, LLP is a Kansas law firm. During the 
2004 tax year, the firm's partners included three attomeys and RCGW 
Investment Management, Inc., a subchapter S corporation that was wholly 
owned by an Employee Stock Ownership Plan and Trust (the "ESOP") 
benefiting the three attomeys. The law fi1m timely filed its partnership tax 
retum for the 2004 tax year, which allocated 87.557% of the law firm's 
net income to the ESOP. The IRS issued an FPAA for tax years 2000, 
2001, and 2002 to the law firm, which: 
(1) Disallowed the special allocation to the ESOP and 
dete1mined that net business income should be reallocated 
to the partners consistent with the profit and loss sharing 
percentages reported on the partners' respective Schedules 
K-1. 
(2) Determined that the partners' distributive shares of the law 
firm's net business income were subject to self-
employment tax. 
Although the law firm asserted that the special allocation to the ESOP was 
proper under the partnership agreement, it could not produce a copy of the 
partnership agreement for the record. Therefore, the court looked to the 
partners' respective interests in the partnership to determine whether the 
special allocation had economic reality. Based on an analysis of relative 
capital contributions, distribution rights, and profit and loss sharing 
percentages, the court concluded that the special allocation of the law 
firm's net business income for the 2004 tax year was improper and should 
be disallowed. 
Section 1402(a) provides several exclusions from the general self-
employment tax rule, including an exclusion under Section 1402(a)(13) for 
the distributive share of any item of income or loss of a limited partner 
(other than guaranteed payments in the nature of remuneration for 
services). Because the term "limited partner" is not defined in the statute, 
the court had to determine whether an attomey partner who provides 
services in a law firm structured as a limited liability partnership can be 
treated as a "limited partner" for purposes of the exclusion under 
Section 1402(a)(13). 
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The court examined the statute's legislative history, which revealed that 
the intent of Section 1402(a)(13) was to ensure that individuals who merely 
invest in a partnership and do not actively participate in the partnership's 
business operations (which was the archetype of limited partners at the 
time) do not receive credits toward Social Security coverage. The court 
detennined that the legislative history did not contemplate excluding 
partners who performed services for a partnership in their capacity as 
partners (i.e., acting in the manner of self-employed persons) from liability 
for self-employment taxes. Because nearly all of the law fum's revenues 
were derived from legal services performed by the attorney partners in 
their capacities as partners, the comt detetmined that the partners' 
distributive shares of the law firm's income did not arise as a return on the 
pmtners' investment and were not "earnings which are basically of an 
investment nature." Therefore, the comt held that the attorney partners' 
distributive shares arising from legal services they performed on behalf of 
the law firm were subject to self-employment taxes. Because the law fnm 
was formed as a limited liability pmtnership rather than a limited 
pmtnership, it did not actually have "limited" or "general" partners as 
would a limited partnership. 
10. The Howell Case. In Howell v. Comm 'r, TCM 2012-303. the Tax Court 
held a couple liable for self-employment tax under Section 1401 on 
payments made to the wife by their LLC, fmding that the couple could not 
disavow the reporting position they took on the company's returns by later 
arguing the payments were partnership distributions rather than guaranteed 
payments. 
In Howell, the taxpayers, husband and wife, formed a California limited 
liability company to provide software and hardware to hospitals consisting 
of a remote access system that enabled doctors to access hospital records 
from outside the hospital. When the LLC was first organized, Mr. Howell 
decided to make Mrs. Howell a member of the LLC rather than himself for 
various reasons. On the LLC's tax returns, the LLC treated the amounts in 
issue as guaranteed payments to Mrs. Howell. The taxpayers later argued 
that these guaranteed payments actually represented distributions from the 
LLC to Mrs. Howell on which no self-employment tax was owed. 
In its decision, the Tax Court cited its earlier decision in Renkemeyer, for 
the proposition that the legislative history of Section 1402(a)(13) does not 
contemplate excluding partners who perform services for a pmtnership in 
their capacity as partners from liability for self-employment taxes, and that 
the Section 1402(a)(13) exemption was only meant to exclude from self-
employment income the distributive share of individuals who merely 
invested in the partnership and who were not actively participating in the 
partnership's business operations, and whose distributive shares were 
earnings "basically of an investment nature." Specifically, the court in 
Renkemeyer held that the taxpayers were not limited partners for purposes 
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of Section 1402(a)(13) because the distributive shares received arose from 
legal services perfmmed on behalf of the law firm by the taxpayers and 
did not arise as a return on the taxpayers' investment in the law fitm. 
While the Tax Court held that Mrs. Howell was subject to SE Tax with 
respect to her guaranteed payments, it did not strictly follow Renkemeyer 
(which would have required a holding that Mrs. Howell was not a limited 
partner). Instead, holding Mrs. Howell to the form of transaction she 
chose, the court concluded that the record established that Mrs. Howell 
performed services for their LLC and that she was not a passive investor, 
that the payments made to her were for services rendered and that Mrs. 
Howell did not satisfy her burden of proving that such payments did not 
constitute payments for services rendered. 
Observation. The Howell case, as well as the Tax Court's prior decision 
in Renkemeyer, indicate that it will be difficult for an LLC member to be 
treated as "limited partner" under Section 1402(a)(l3) for purposes of 
excluding his or her distributive share of the income of the LLC from the 
self-employment tax any time such member provides services to or on 
behalf of the LLC and who is characterized other than as a passive 
investor of the LLC. This should be contrasted with a shareholder of an S 
corporation who materially participates in the business, where only 
amounts paid as reasonable salary should be subject to Social Security 
taxes on such wages, and the shareholder's distributive share of the 
income of the S corporation and all dividend distributions should be 
exempt from the self-employment tax and Social Security taxes by reason 
of Rev. Rul. 59-221, 1959-1, CB 225, and Section 1402(a)(2). An S 
corporation shareholder who materially participates in an active trade or 
business canied on by an S corporation should also not be subject to the 
new tax imposed on net investment income with respect to such 
shareholder's distributive share of the S corporation's income by virtue of 
Section 1411(c)(2)(A).14 
11. The Riether Case. In Riether v. Comm 'r, 919 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 112 
AFTR2d 2013-6074 (DC N.M. 2012), the court rejected on summary 
judgment a radiologist's and his wife's claim that they were not liable for 
self-employment tax on their distributive share of income from a 
diagnostic imaging LLC taxed as a partnership. Although not clear from 
the facts of the case, presumably all of the income of the diagnostic 
imaging LLC was attributable to the "facility fee or "technical 
component" of the imaging services provided. by the LLC rather than for. 
professional medical (reading) services. 
14 The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, H.R. 4872, P.L. 111-152, imposes a 3.8% Medicare 
tax on the lesser of(a) net investment income or (b) the excess ofmodified adjusted gross income over $250,000 in 
the case of taxpayers filing a joint return and over $200,000 for other taxpayers. The definition of net investment 
income is quite expansive for purposes of the new 3.8% Medicare tax imposed under Section 1411(a)(1). 
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The LLC actually issued W-2s to husband and wife showing salaries or 
wages paid by the LLC to each of them for a portion of the LLC's income. 
For the balance of the LLC's income, K-ls were issued to husband and 
wife on which they did not pay self-employment tax. 
Citing Rev. Rul. 69-184, 1969-1 CB 256, the court stated that the LLC 
should have treated all of the LLC's income as self-employment income, 
rather than characterizing some of it as wages. Specifically, Rev. Rul. 69-
184 states that members of a partnership are not employees of the 
pminership for purposes of self-employment taxes. Rather, a pminer who 
pmiicipates in the partnership business is "a self-employed individual." 
The court found that the LLC's improper treatment of the "wages" income 
futiher undermined the taxpayers' simplistic argument that they owed no 
self-employment taxes simply because they received W -2s. 
The taxpayers also argued that the income of the LLC was "unearned 
income," and as such, was not subject to the self-employment tax. The 
couti stated that simply labeling income as "unearned income" does not 
exempt such amounts from the self-employment tax. Rather, the court 
reiterated that the self-employment tax applies to a taxpayer's distributive 
share of all partnership income with only certain limited exceptions. 
Citing Section 1402(a)(13), which exempts from the self-employment tax 
a limited partner's distributive share of income from a limited partnership, 
and the Renkemeyer case, the court concluded that the taxpayers were not 
members of a limited partnership, nor did they resemble limited patiners, 
which are those who "lack management powers but enjoy immunity from 
liability for debts of the pminership." Thus, whether the taxpayers were 
active or passive in the production of the LLC's earnings, those earnings 
were self-employment income, subject to the self-employment tax. 
12. ILM 201436049. In ILM 201436049 (9/5/2014), the IRS found that 
members of a management company LLC ("Management Company") 
were not "limited partners" within the meaning of Section 1402(a)(13) and 
therefore were subject to the self-employment tax on their distributive 
shares of income of the Management Company. 
Under the facts of the mling, a limited liability company classified as a 
partnership for federal tax purposes served as the investment manager for 
"Managed Fund," a family of investment partnership funds that carry on 
extensive trading and investing activity (the "Funds"). 
The Management Company generally has full authority and responsibility 
to manage and control the affairs and business of the Funds. The 
Management Company is primarily responsible for carrying out the 
extensive market research and trading activity of each of the Funds, and 
carries on all investment activities, such as the purchasing, managing, 
restmcturing and selling of the Funds' investment assets. Members of the 
Management Company and its employees provide these extensive services 
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to the Funds. The Management Company's primary source of income is 
from fees for providing management services to the Funds. In 
consideration of the Management Company's services, the limited 
partnership agreements of each of the Funds provide for payment of a 
quarterly "management fee" from the Funds to The Management 
Company. For the years in issue, the Management Company's gross 
receipts were entirely attributable to management fees for providing 
services to the Funds, and the Management Company's ordinary business 
income was comprised entirely of income from management fees. 
Additionally, in the years in issue, each member of the Management 
Company worked full time for the Management Company, performing a 
wide-range of professional services. Each of the members receives a 
Form W-2 from the Management Company for specified wage amounts. 
For the years in issue, the Management Company treated all of its 
members as "limited partners" not subject to the self-employment tax on 
their distributive share of the Management Company's income. The only 
amounts reported as subject to self-employment tax were guaranteed 
payments representing health insurance premiums and parking benefits 
paid on behalf of the members by the Management Company. 
The Management Company argued that the "wage" amounts represent 
"reasonable compensation" for each member of the Management 
Company, and that each member is a limited partner with respect to their 
distributive share of the income of the Management Company. The 
Management Company reasoned that because the Management Company 
has the same role in the business as the S corporation it succeeded, it can 
continue to apply the same "reasonable compensation" wage rules 
applicable to S corporations. 
The ruling relies heavily on the legislative history behind Section 
1402( a)( 13) and the Renkemeyer and Riether cases discussed above. 
Specifically, Section 1402(a)(13) provides that there shall be excluded 
from self-employment income the distributive share of any item of income 
or loss of a limited partner, as such, other than guaranteed payments 
described in Section 707(c) to that member for services actually rendered 
to or on behalf of the partnership to the extent that those payments are 
established to be in the nature of remuneration for those services. 
The legislative histmy for the exception in Section 1402(a)(13) clarifies 
that Congress did not intend to allow service partners in a service 
partnership acting in the manner of self-employed persons to avoid paying 
self-employment tax. The ruling goes on to cite the Renkemeyer case, in 
which the Tax Couti found that the attorney-partners of an LLP engaged 
in the practice of law who were lawyers performing services for the LLP 
were not limited partners within the meaning of Section 1402(a)(13) for 
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purposes of excluding their distributive share of the income of the LLP 
from the self-employment tax. The Tax Court in Renkemeyer went on to 
provide that the share of the law film's income did not arise as a return on 
the partners' investment and were not "earnings which are basically of an 
investment nature." 
The mling goes on to cite the Riether case discussed above, where the 
court granted the government's motion for summary judgment on the issue 
of whether a husband and wife were subject to self-employment tax on 
their distributive share of income from an LLC. In the Riether case, the 
court concluded that Section 1402(a)(13) only applies to limited partners 
and not to taxpayers treated as a general partner, "irrespective of the 
nature of his membership." The court went on to find that the taxpayers 
were not members of a limited partnership, nor did they resemble limited 
partners, which are those who "lack management powers but enjoy 
immunity from liability for debts of the partnership." The Riether case 
concluded that whether the taxpayers were active or passive in the 
production of the LLC's earnings, those earnings were self-employment 
income subject to the self-employment tax. 
The mling goes on to provide that the Management Company's members 
perfmmed extensive investment and operational management services for 
the Management Company in their capacity as members (i.e., acting in the 
mallller of self-employed persons) and that the Management Company 
derives its income from the investment management services performed 
by its members. The IRS concluded that the income earned by the 
members through the Management Company was not income which was 
"basically of an investment nature" of the sort that Congress sought to 
exclude from self-employment tax when it enacted the predecessor to 
Section 1402(a)(l3). Additionally, the IRS stated that like the situation in 
Renkemeyer, the members' earnings were not in the nature of a return on 
capital investment, even though the members paid more than a nominal 
amount for their membership interests. Rather, the IRS found that the 
earnings of each member from the Management Company were a direct 
result of the services rendered on behalf of the Management Company by 
such members. The IRS also stated that similar to Riether, the 
Management Company cannot change the character of its members' 
distributive shares by paying a portion of each member's distributive share 
as amounts mislabeled as so-called "wages," citing Rev. Rul. 69-184, 
1969-1, C.B. 256. 
Finally, the IRS expressly stated that because The Management Company 
was not an S corporation, the "reasonable compensation" rules applicable 
to S corporations do not apply (which will be discussed below and are a 
major advantage of operating as an S corporation rather than as an LLC). 
F. S CORPORATIONS 
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Because the Federal Insurance Contributions Act ("FICA") and Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act ("FUTA") taxes may be substantial, many shareholder-
employees of S corporations have employed a strategy of decreasing the amount 
of wages that they receive from the S corporation and correspondingly increasing 
the amount of S corporation distributions made to them. 
1. Social Security Taxes on Wages. As part of FICA, a tax is imposed on 
employees and employers up to a prescribed maximum amount of 
employee wages. This tax is comprised of two parts, the Old-Age, 
Survivor, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) portion and the Medicare 
Hospital Insurance (HI) portion. The HI tax rate is 1.45% on both the 
employer and the employee, and the OASDI tax rate is 6.2% on both the 
employer and the employee. The maximum wages subject to the OASDI 
tax rate for 2014 is $117,000. 
RRA '93 repealed the dollar limit on wages and self-employment income 
subject to the HI portion of the FICA tax as well as the self-employment 
tax. Thus, employers and employees will equally be subject to the 1.45% 
HI tax on all wages, and self-employed individuals will be subject to the 
2.9% HI tax on all self-employment income. 
As discussed above, beginning in 2013, the HI portion of the Social 
Security tax will be increased from 2.9% (combined employer and 
employee) to 3.8% (combined employer and employee) for wages in 
excess of $250,000 for married individuals filing jointly and in excess of 
$200,000 for other taxpayers. Additionally, as discussed above, beginning 
in 2013, a taxpayer having modified adjusted gross income in excess of 
$250,000 in the case of mmTied individuals filing jointly and $200,000 for 
other taxpayers will be subject to the 3.8% net investment income tax. 
2. Social Security Taxes and S Corporations. In order for shareholder-
employees of S corporations to realize employment tax savings by 
withdrawing funds in the fmm of distributions rather than compensation, 
such distributions must not be recharacterized as "wages" for FICA 
purposes or as NESE for purposes of theSE Tax. For FICA and FUTA 
purposes, Sections 3121(a) and 3306(b), respectively, define the term 
"wages" to mean all remuneration for employment, including the cash 
value of all remuneration (including benefits) paid in any medium other 
than cash, with certain exceptions. 
Although it might appear at first glance that a shareholder's distributive 
share of income from an S corporation constitutes NESE since a general 
partner's distributive share of the income of any trade or business carried 
on by a partnership of which he is a member generally constitutes NESE 
subject to the SE Tax, in Rev. Rul. 59-221, 1959-1 C.B. 225, the IRS 
found that an S corporation's income does not constitute NESE for 
purposes of the SE Tax. Additionally, Section 1402(a)(2) specifically 
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excludes from the definition of NESE dividends on shares of stock issued 
by a corporation. 
Consequently, neither a shareholder's distributive share of income passed 
through from the S corporation under Section 1366 nor any S corporation 
distributions actually received by the shareholder from the S corporation 
constitute NESE subject to theSE Tax. In Rev. Rul. 66-327, 1966-2 C.B. 
357, the IRS found that the taxable income of an S corporation included in 
its shareholders' gross income is not income derived from a trade or 
business for purposes of computing the shareholders' net operating losses 
under Section 172( c). Similarly in Ltr. Rul. 8716060, the IRS concluded 
that the income derived by a shareholder-employee from an S corporation 
did not constitute net eamings from self-employment for self-employment 
tax purposes and that such taxpayer was not eligible to adopt a qualified 
pension plan based on the income derived fi·om his S corporation since 
such income did not constitute eamed income. 
Because wages paid to shareholder-employees of S corporations are 
subject to Social Security taxes while S corporation distributions are not, 
shareholder-employees have an opportunity for significant tax savings by 
withdrawing funds from the S corporation in the fmm of distributions 
rather than wages. Prior to advising an S corporation with shareholder-
employees to undertake such a tax planning strategy, however, the tax 
practitioner should analyze the economic and tax consequences that such a 
strategy will have on the S corporation and its shareholders. 15 
Although the amount of funds available for distribution to an S 
corporation's shareholder-employees will increase as the wages paid to 
them decrease, all distributions made by the S corporation to its 
shareholders must be made in proportion to the number of shares held by 
such shareholders under Section 1361(b)(l)(D). Thus, if an S corporation 
which has both shareholders who are employees and shareholders who are 
not employees adopts a tax strategy to reduce Social Security taxes by 
minimizing wages and maximizing distributions, the increase in the 
amount of distributions received by the shareholders who are employees 
will be less than the amount by which their wages were reduced (since 
distributions must also be made to the shareholders who are not 
employees). Additionally, a program that minimizes the amount of wages 
paid to shareholder-employees will increase: (1) purchase price formulas 
based on eamings; and (2) bonus formulas based on eamings. Decreasing 
the amount of wages paid to shareholder-employees of S corporations also 
15 See generally, Looney & Levitt, Reasonable Compensation Issues for Closely-held and Service Companies," 61st 
N.Y.U. Ann. Inst. Fed. Tax'n 16 (2003); Looney & Comiter, "Reasonable Compensation: Dividends vs. Wages- A 
Reverse in Positions," 7 J. Partnership Tax'n 364 (Winter 1991); Clements & StJ.·eer, "How Low Can Owner-
Employee Compensation be Set to Save on Employment Taxes?" 2 J. S. Corp. Tax'n 37 (1990); Andrews, "Current 
Non-Stock Executive Compensation and Fringe Benefit Issues," 1 S Corp.: J. Tax, Leg. & Bus. Strategies 3 (1989); 
and Spradling, "AreS Corp. Disn·ibutions Wages Subject to Withholding?" 71 J. Tax'n 104 (1989). 
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will reduce the contribution base for contributions to the corporation's 
qualified plans. 
3. S Corporations and Unreasonably Low Compensation - Reclassifica-
tion Risks. 
a. In Rev. Rul. 74-44, 1974-1 C.B. 287, two shareholders of an S 
corporation withdrew no salary from the corporation and arranged 
for the corporation to pay them dividends equal to the amount that 
they would have othetwise received as reasonable compensation 
for services performed. This arrangement was made for the 
express purpose of avoiding payment of federal employment taxes. 
Based on the expansive definition of wages for FICA and Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act ("FUTA") purposes (which includes all 
remuneration for employment), the IRS found that the dividends 
paid to the shareholders constituted wages for FICA and FUTA 
purposes. Rev. Rul. 74-44 did not, however, address the issue of 
what constitutes reasonable compensation in the S corporation 
context since the ruling expressly stated that the dividends were 
received by the shareholder-employees in lieu of the reasonable 
compensation that would have otherwise been paid to them. 
Despite this shortcoming, Rev. Rul. 74-44 clearly indicates that the 
payment of no compensation will be umeasonable where 
shareholder-employees provide substantial services to the 
corporation. 16 
b. In Radtke v. US., 895 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1990), the court 
recharacterized distributions made to the sole shareholder (an 
attorney) of an S corporation (a law firm) as wages subject to 
FICA and FUTA taxes, where the shareholder made all of his 
withdrawals from the S corporation in the fonn of S corporation 
distributions and received no salary from the S corporation during 
the tax year. The court relied on a broad definition of wages for 
FICA and FUTA purposes as all remuneration for employment, 
and concluded that the dividend payments were remuneration for 
services performed by the shareholder for the S corporation. 
Likewise, in Spicer Accounting, Incorporated v. US., 918 F.2d 80 
(9th Cir. 1990), the court recharacterized dividend distributions 
made to a shareholder (an accountant) of an S corporation (an 
accounting firm) as wages subject to FICA and FUTA taxes where 
the shareholder received no salary during the tax year. 
16 See also Rev. Rul. 71-86, 1971-1 C.B. 285 (president and sole shareholder of closely-held corporation found to be 
an "employee" of the corporation for employment tax purposes); Rev. Rul. 73-361, 1973-2 C.B. 331 (officer-
shareholder of an S corporation who performed substantial services as an officer of the S corporation is an 
"employee" of the corporation for purposes of FICA, FUTA and income tax withholding); and Ltr. Rul. 7949022 
(shareholder-employees of S corporation who perform substantial services for S corporation treated as "employees" 
for employment tax purposes). 
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c. Additionally, in Fred R. Esser, P.C. v. US., 750 F. Supp. 421 (D. 
Ariz. 1990), the court recharacterized amounts received by the sole 
shareholder, officer and director of a legal services S corporation, 
as wages subject to FICA and FUTA taxes, rather than as 
distributions. As in the Radtke and Spicer Accounting cases, the 
shareholder received no salmy from the S corporation during the 
tax year. 
d. In Donald G. Cave, A Professional Law Cmp. v. Comm'r, 109 
AFTR2d 91 2012-609 (5th Cir. 2012), ajf'g per curiam, TCM 
2011-48, the court held that all of the non -shareholder attomeys, as 
well as a law clerk, of a law finn were common law employees 
rather than independent contractors, and also recharacterized the 
distributions made to the sole shareholder of the law firm, who was 
detennined to be a statutory employee, as wages subject to Social 
Security taxes. 
e. In David E. Watson P.C. v. US., 668 F.3d 1008 (8th Cir. 2012), 
aff'g 757 F. Supp. 2d 877 (S.D. Iowa 2010), the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court 
recharacterizing a significant portion of dividend distributions 
made by an S corporation to its sole shareholder as wages subject 
to Social Security taxes. 
During the years in issue, 2002 and 2003, David E. Watson, CPA 
("Watson"), provided accounting services to a palinership 
("LWBJ") and its clients as an employee of David E. Watson P.C., 
an S corporation (the "S Corporation"). The S Corporation was a 
25% partner in L WBJ. The IRS made assessments against Watson 
after it detetmined that portions of the dividend distributions from 
the S Corporation to Watson should be recharacterized as wages 
subject to employment taxes. Specifically, the IRS contended that 
$130,730.05 out of a total of $203,651 of dividend payments to 
Watson for 2002 should be recharacterized as wages subject to 
employment taxes, and that $175,470 out of a total of$203,651 of 
dividend payments to Watson for 2003 should be recharacterized 
as wages subject to employment taxes. In both years, Watson 
received a salary of $24,000 in addition to the dividend 
distributions. 
In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Watson argued that the 
intent of the S Corporation was controlling in determining the 
characterization of the payments from the S Corporation to 
Watson. Because the S Corporation clearly intended to pay 
Watson compensation of only $24,000 per year, Watson contended 
that any amounts distributed in excess of the $24,000 were 
properly classified as dividends. In support ofhis position, Watson 
cited Electric & Neon, Inc. v. Comm 'r, 56 TC 1324 (1971); Paula 
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Construction Co. v. Comm 'r, 58 TC 1055 (1972), and Pediatric 
Surgical Associates, P.C. v. Comm 'r, TCM 2001-81. 
Citing Rev. Rul. 74-44, 1974-1 CB 287, Radtke, Spicer Accounting 
and Veterinary Surgical Consultants, the district court found that 
the intent of the S Corporation was not controlling in determining 
the character of the payments, but rather that the analysis turns on 
whether the payments at issue were made as remuneration for 
services perfonned. Consequently, the court denied Watson's 
Motion for Summary Judgment because it found that there was a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the dividends paid to 
Watson by the S Corporation were remuneration for services 
perfonned subject to employment taxes. 
After denying the taxpayer's Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
district court held a bench trial on the merits. At trial, the 
government's expert opined that the market value of Watson's 
accounting services was approximately $91,044 per year for 2002 
and 2003. The government's expert was a general engineer with 
the IRS and had worked on approximately 20 to 30 cases involving 
reasonable compensation issues. In forming his opinion as to 
Watson's salaty, the government's expert relied on several 
compensation surveys and studies particularly relating to 
accountants. The district court ultimately adopted the government 
expert witness's opinion and determined that the reasonable 
amount of Watson's remuneration for services performed totaled 
$91,044 for each of2002 and 2003. 
In addition to determining the issues of what constituted 
reasonable compensation to the sole shareholder of the S 
corporation and whether intent was the dete1minative factor in 
determining whether payments from an S corporation to its sole 
shareholder should be characterized as wages or as dividend 
distributions, the court first addressed the taxpayer's argument that 
the district court erred in allowing the government's expert to 
testify on the issue of reasonable compensation because he was not 
competent to testify on that issue. Specifically, the taxpayer 
asserted that the government's expert witness was not qualified, 
changed his opinion, relied on insufficient underlying facts, and 
used flawed methods in rendering his opinion. After reviewing all 
of these factors in detail, the court of appeals determined that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony 
of the government's expert witness, and found the taxpayer's 
arguments meritless. 
In reaching its decision, the Eighth Circuit cited Rev. Rul. 74-44, 
Radtke, Spicer Accounting and Veterinary Surgical Consultants 
cases (discussed above), and concluded that the district court 
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properly determined that the characterization of funds disbursed by 
an S corporation to its shareholders turns on an analysis of whether 
the payments at issue were made as remuneration for services 
performed. The court went on to state that the district court found 
that the S corporation understated wage payments to its sole 
shareholder by $67,044 in each year based on a variety of factors. 
These factors included the following evidence: (1) Watson was an 
exceedingly qualified accountant with an advanced degree and 
nearly 20 years in accounting and taxation; (2) Watson worked 35-
45 hours per week as one of the primary earners in a reputable 
finn, which had earnings much greater than comparable firms; (3) 
the partnership had gross eamings of over $2M in 2002 and nearly 
$3M in 2003; (4) $24,000 is umeasonably low compared to other 
similarly situated accountants; (5) given the financial position of 
the partnership, Watson's experience and his contributions to the 
partnership, a $24,000 salary was exceedingly low when compared 
to the roughly $200,000 the partnership distributed to Watson's S 
corporation in 2002 and 2003; and ( 6) the fair market value of 
Watson's services was $91,034. 
The Eighth Circuit next addressed the taxpayer's argument that 
instead of focusing on reasonableness, the district court should 
have focused on the S corporation's intent. While acknowledging 
that § 162( a)(1) provides that the deductibility of compensation is a 
two prong test in that the compensation must both be reasonable in 
amount and in fact payments purely for services, the court, citing 
Elliotts, Inc. v. Comm 'r, 716 F.2d 1241, 83-2 USTC ~9610 (9th 
Cir. 1983), rev'g TCM 1980-282, stated that courts usually only 
need to examine the first prong since the reasonableness prong 
generally subsumes the inquiry into compensatory intent in most 
cases. The court did state however, that in certain rare cases 
whether there is evidence that an otherwise reasonable 
compensation payment contains a disguised dividend, the inquiry 
may expand into compensatory intent apart from reasonableness. 
In the case, the taxpayer cited Pediatric Surgical Associates in 
support of his position that taxpayer intent controls in FICA tax 
characterization cases. The Eighth Circuit found that even if intent 
does control, after evaluating all the evidence, the district court 
specifically found that the shareholder's asse1tion that the S 
corporation intended to pay him a salary of only $24,000 a year to 
be less than credible. Additionally, the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals went on to reject the argument made by the taxpayer that 
Pediatric Surgical Associates limited the amount that could be 
characterized as wages to the amount of revenue each shareholder-
employee personally generated less expenses since, like Pediatric 
Surgical Associates, nonshareholder-employees also contributed to 
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the S corporation's earnings. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
brushed this argument aside by saying that although they thought 
evidence of shareholder-employee billings and collections may be 
probative on the issue of compensation, in light of all the evidence 
presented to the district court in the case, they saw no elTor and 
affirmed the decision of the district court. 
f. In Herbert v. Comm 'r, TC Summ. Op. 2012-124, the Tax Court 
recharacterized a portion of the amounts the taxpayer claimed were 
used to pay business expenses as wages subject to Social Security 
taxes, finding the taxpayer's salary was unreasonably low. 
However, the Tax Court expressly rejected the IRS's contention 
that the taxpayer's salary be increased by $52,600, primarily based 
on the salaty paid by the S corporation to the shareholder in a prior 
year in which the business was not owned by the taxpayer. 
g. 
In reaching this decision, the Tax Court believed and accepted the 
taxpayer's testimony that the taxpayer in fact paid significant 
expenses of the corporation with cash funds received from the 
corporation. Additionally, the court found that in spite of limited 
evidence before them, they believed that it was improper and 
excessive to charge the taxpayer with receipt from the corporation 
in 2007 of $52,600 in additional wages. On the other hand, the 
court stated that the taxpayer's reported wages of $2,400 was 
unreasonably low. 
Consequently, citing Mayson Manufacturing Co. v. Comm 'r, 178 
F.2d 115 (61h Cir. 1949), the Tax Court averaged the taxpayer's 
wages for 2002 through 2006, and used the average amount as the 
total for the taxpayer's 2007 wages subject to employment taxes 
($30,445). 
In Sean McClary Ltd., Inc. v. Comm 'r, TC Summ. Op. 2013-62, 
the Tax Court recharacterized the distributions made by an S 
corporation to its sole shareholder as wages subject to Social 
Security taxes where the shareholder received no salary from the S 
corporation and also found that the annual compensation formula 
contained in the Board of Directors minutes setting a salary of 
$24,000 was unreasonably low. 
Mr. McClary was the president, secretary, treasurer, sole director 
and sole shareholder of his S corporation. He managed all aspects 
of the S corporation's operations, including recruiting and 
supervising sales agents, conducting real estate sales, procuring 
advertising, purchasing supplies, and maintaining basic books and 
records, Mr. McClary often worked 12-hour days with few days 
off. For the year in issue, Mr. McClary supervised eight sales 
agents, four of whom generated sales commissions for the S 
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corporation that year, but most of the S corporation's gross receipts 
were attributable to sales commissions generated by Mr. McClary 
himself. 
For the year in issue, the S corporation did not issue a form W-2, 
Wage and Tax Statement, to Mr. McClary, nor did it claim a 
deduction for the amount paid to Mr. McClary as wages or 
compensation for services. During such year, Mr. McClary 
transferr-ed a total of $240,000 fi·om the S corporation's account to 
his personal account. 
In determining what portion of the $240,000 of distributions 
should be recharacterized as wages, the IRS's expert witness found 
that $100,755 represented reasonable compensation for services 
rendered by Mr. McClary for the year in issue. On the other hand, 
Mr. McClaty argued that even though he did not pay himself a 
salary, the salary of $24,000 set forth in the compensation 
anangement in the corporation's minutes should be the only 
amount characterized as wages subject to Social Security taxes. 
The Tax Court, citing the multi-factor test used in determining 
reasonable compensation for shareholder employees of C 
corporations, found that reasonable compensation for Mr. 
McClary's services during the year in issue was $83,200, and as 
such, recharacterized $83,200 of the $240,000 distributed by the S 
corporation to Mr. McClary as wages subject to Social Security 
taxes. 
h. In Glass Blocks Unlimited v. Comm'r, TCM 2013-180, the Tax 
Court recharacterized the total distributions made by an S 
corporation to its president, sole shareholder and only full-time 
employee, of $30,844 in 2007 and $31,644 in 2008, as wages 
subject to Social Security taxes. 
Citing Veterinary Surgical Consultants P. C. v. Comm 'r, 17 that an 
officer who performs more than minor services for a corporation 
and receives remuneration in any form for those services is 
considered an employee, and his or her wages are subject to the 
employer's payment of federal employment taxes. The court went 
on to fmd that the taxpayer was the S corporation's only officer, 
and sole full-time worker in 2007 and 2008 and performed 
substantially all the work necessary to operate the business. 
The Tax Court went on to reject the taxpayer's argument that the 
distributions constituted repayment of shareholder loans, and the 
taxpayer's argument that the characterization of all distributions 
17 117 TC 141 (2001), affd Sub Nom. Yeagle Drywall Co. v. Comm'r, 54 Fed. Appx. 100 (2nd Cir. 2002). 
48 
( 
from the S corporation to him as wages constituted unreasonably 
high compensation to him, citing the multi-factor test used in 
Elliotts, Inc. v. Comm 'r. 18 Consequently, the Tax Court found that 
the total amount of distributions made by the S corporation to its 
sole shareholder constituted wages subject to Social Security taxes 
for the years in issue. 
The Herbert, Watson and McClary cases involve situations where 
only a portion of amounts not treated as wages are recharacterized 
as wages subject to Social Security taxes, and each involves 
different methods in determining what constitutes "reasonable 
compensation" to the shareholder-employees of an S corporation. 
i. The Watson case, the Herbert case and the McClary case are the 
first reported decisions in which the court was presented with a 
situation which was riot clearly abusive such as those presented in 
Radtke and Spicer Accounting (i.e, where all of the earnings of the 
S corporations were paid to the sole shareholder as dividend 
distributions and no salary was paid to the shareholder by the S 
corporation). Consequently, the Watson, Herbert and McClary 
decisions represent impmiant victories for the IRS in being able to 
recharacterize dividend distributions as wages where at least some 
(but less than a reasonable) salary has been paid to the shareholder-
employees of the S corporation. On the other hand, these cases can 
be viewed as favorable to taxpayers as they allowed personal 
service S corporations to distribute some amount of their income 
without being subject to Social Security taxes. However, the 
Watson case is somewhat troubling in its rejection of the decision 
reached in the Pediatric Surgical Associates, P.C. case (in which 
the IRS sought to recharacterize wages of a C corporation as 
dividend distributions rather than vice versa), in that the court did 
not seem to take into account the fact that dividend distributions 
can indeed be generated by the services of nonshareholder-
employees of an S corporation or from other ancillary services not 
provided by the shareholder-employees of the S corporation. 
j. The Radtke, Spicer Accounting and Esser cases indicate that in 
abusive situations, such as where the shareholders of an S 
corporation make all withdrawals from the S corporation in the 
fmm of S corporation distributions and receive no salary from the 
S corporation during the tax year, the courts will recharacterize 
such distributions as wages subject to Social Security taxes. These 
earlier cases have been followed in more recent cases. See 
Veterinary Surgical Consultants, P.C. v. Comm 'r, 117 TC 14 
(2001), Van Camp and Brennion v. U.S., 251 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 
2001), Old Raleigh Realty Corp. v. Comm'r., TC Summ. Op. 
18 716 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1983) rev TCM 1980-282. 
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2002-61, David E. Watson P.C. v. US., 668 F.3d 1008 (8th Cir. 
2012), aff'g 757 F. Supp. 2d 877 (S.D. Iowa 2010), Herbert v. 
Comm'r, TC Summ. Op. 2012-124, Sean McClary Ltd., Inc. v. 
Comm 'r, TC Summ. Op. 2013-62 and Glass Blocks Unlimited v. 
Comm'r, TCM 2013-180. 
k. In non-abusive situations, however, the IRS may have difficulty in 
successfully asserting that distributions made by S corporations to 
shareholder-employees should be recharacterized as wages subject 
to Social Security taxes. In order for the IRS to recharacterize S 
corporation distributions as wages subject to Social Security taxes 
in non-abusive situations, the IRS would have to overcome: (i) the 
lack of express authority for its position (unlike the express 
authority granted to the IRS under Section 1366(e) to 
recharacterize dividend distributions as wages in the family 
context); (ii) the burden of overcoming the initial characterization 
of the payment as a distribution; and (iii) the unce1iainty 
surrounding the utilization of Section 162(a)(l) by the IRS in the 
employment context to bring salaries up to a reasonable level. 
I. Consequently, in such situations, a tax strategy of decreasing 
wages and correspondingly increasing distributions to shareholder-
employees could result in substantial employment tax savings. As 
a result of this tax planning technique, the IRS, the Joint 
Committee on Taxation and the Department of Treasury have 
issued repmis and notices addressing the use of S corporations as a 
means of avoiding the SE Tax. 
G. RECENT ATTEMPTS TO SUBJECTS CORPORATIONS TO THE SELF-
EMPLOYMENT TAX 
There have been numerous attempts in recent years to subject S corporation 
eamings to the self-employment tax. 
1. In 2002, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration issued a 
report entitled "The Intemal Revenue Service Does Not Always Address 
Subchapter S Corporation Officer Compensation During Examinations," 
(Reference No. 2002-30-125 (July 5, 2002)), where it was found that IRS 
examiners failed to address officer compensation issues in 13 out of 58 
cases reviewed, and it was recommended that additional technical 
guidance be given to field personnel in determining reasonable officer 
compensation. 
2. On April 5, 2004, the IRS issued a news release, I.R. 2004-47, identifying 
several types of "schemes" to avoid the payment of employment taxes that 
have resulted in adverse court rulings or convictions of taxpayers. Among 
the schemes listed is "S corporation officers' compensation treated as 
corporate distributions", which it describes as follows: "In an effort to 
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avoid employment taxes, some corporations are improperly treating 
officer compensation as a corporate distribution instead of wages or 
salary. By law, officers are employees of the corporation for employment 
tax purposes and compensation they have received for their services is 
subject to employment taxes." 
3. In January, 2005, the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation ("JCT") 
released a report titled "Options to Improve Tax Compliance and Refmm 
Tax Expenditures." This report proposed that S corporations be treated as 
partnerships and any shareholders of S corporations be treated as general 
partners. As a result, the shareholders of the S corporation would be 
subject to SE Tax on their shares of S corporation net income (whether or 
not distributed) in the same manner as partners. Under the JCT's 
proposal, with respect to service businesses, all shareholders' net income 
from the S corporation would be treated as NESE. 
4. On May 25, 2005, J. Russell George, the Inspector General, Treasury, 
Inspector General, for Tax Administration testified before the Senate 
Finance Committee, complaining about the employment tax inequities that 
exist between sole-proprietorships and single-shareholder S corporations. 
Mr. George noted that the amount of potential employment tax collection 
lost in 2000 was 5.7 billion dollars based on a comparison of the profits of 
single-shareholder S corporations and the amounts shown by the single 
shareholder as compensation subject to employment tax. In connection 
with that testimony, Pamela Gardiner, Deputy Inspector General for Audit 
of the Inspector General for Tax Administration issued a final audit report 
entitled "Actions are Needed to Eliminate Inequities in the Employment 
Tax Liabilities of Sole-Proprietorships and Single-Shareholder S 
Corporations." 
5. In July, 2005, the IRS announced its plan to conduct an intensive study of 
5,000 randomly selected S corporations. The IRS repmis that the study 
will be used to more accurately gauge the extent to which the income, 
deductions and credits from S corporations are properly reported on 
returns and will assist the IRS in selecting and auditing S corporation 
returns with greater compliance risks. While the notice did not specify 
that compliance with the SE Tax rules is a focus of the study, it is not 
difficult to imagine that the SE Tax was one of the issues that will be 
closely watched. 
6. In conjunction with its 2005 report, the Senate Finance Committee 
released a report on October 19, 2006 entitled "Additional Options to 
Improve Tax Compliance" that was prepared by the members of the JCT. 
The repmi addressed, among other things, a proposal that would generally 
treat service partnerships, LLCs and S corporations the same for SE Tax 
purposes, so that a partner's, member's or shareholder's distributive share 
of income from a service entity would be subject to the SE Tax. The 
proposal sought to eliminate the "choice of business form" decision that 
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results in substantially different tax liability for otherwise similar forms of 
business. 
7. In reaction to this "controversial and politically charged" report, the 
Partnerships and LLCs Committee and the S Corporations Committee of 
the American Bar Association published their comments. These comments 
suggested, among other things, that the rules cunently in effect for S 
corporations were conect and should not be changed. 
8. Senator Rangel introduced a Bill in 2007 that would essentially subject all 
income from a service entity, whether a partnership, LLC or S corporation, 
to the SE Tax. 
9. The Joint Committee on Taxation again addressed theSE Tax issue in JCT 
Report (JCX-48-08) on Selected Federal Tax Reform Issues Relating to 
Small Business, Choice of Entity for a June 5, 2008, Senate Finance 
Committee Hearing. 
10. In IRS Fact Sheet FS-2008-25, the IRS clarified infmmation that small 
business taxpayers should understand regarding the tax law for corporate 
officers who perfmm services for S corporations. In the Fact Sheet, the 
IRS points out that just because an officer is also a shareholder of the S 
corporation, it does not change the requirement that payments to the 
corporate officer must be treated as wages, and that courts have 
consistently held that S corporation officer-shareholders who provide 
more than minor services to the corporation and who receive or are 
entitled to receive payments are employees whose compensation is subject 
to federal employment taxes. 
The Fact Sheet goes on to discuss that although there are no "bright line" 
tests for detetmining what constitutes "reasonable compensation" to S 
corporation officer-shareholders, the following factors have been 
considered by the comis in determining reasonable compensation: 
a. Training and experience. 
b. Duties and responsibilities. 
c. Time and effort devoted to the business. 
d. Dividend histmy. 
e. Payments to non-shareholder employees. 
f. Timing and manner of paying bonuses to key people. 
g. What comparable business pay for similar services. 
h. Compensation agreements. 
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i. The use of a formula to dete1mine compensation. 
11. Faris Fink, Commissioner of the Small Business and Self-Employed 
Division of the IRS, stated on October 29, 2008 that over the next 12 
months the Small Business and Self-Employed Division of the IRS will 
focus on taxpayer services and increased enforcement, and that S 
corporations "will be a significant compliance challenge going forward," 
noting that the Small Business and Self-Employed Division must cany out 
a better examination of S corporations and how they are used. 
12. On January 15, 2010, the United States Govemment Accountability Office 
("GAO") released a report entitled "Tax Gap: Actions Needed to Address 
Noncompliance with S Corporation Tax Rules" (the "Report") (December 
15, 2009, GA0-10-195). The author participated in the GAO study as part 
of a group of individuals who are members of the S Corporations 
Committee of the American Bar Association ("ABA") Tax Section. This 
group of individuals also included the immediate past Chair of the S 
Corporations Committee, Tom Nichols. The participation of such persons 
in the study was solely as individuals and not as representatives of the S 
Corporations Committee or the ABA Tax Section. 
The involvement of this group included participating in a preliminary 
telephone call with GAO representatives, the review of a list of "S 
corporation Interview Topics" prepared by the GAO, and a lengthy 
follow-up telephone conference with GAO representatives. 
The purpmied purpose of the GAO study was to look at "compliance 
challenges" for S corporations and their shareholders. The genesis of the 
GAO study seems to be the report released on October 19, 2006 entitled 
"Additional Options to Improve Tax Compliance" that was prepared by 
members of the Joint Committee on Taxation. The purpose of this repmi 
was to find ways to close the "tax gap." Simply defined, the "tax gap" is 
the difference between the federal income tax that taxpayers should be 
paying if they fully complied with the federal tax laws currently in effect, 
and the actual amount of federal income taxes being paid by taxpayers. 
The repmi addressed, among other things, a proposal that would generally 
treat service pa1inerships, LLCs and S corporations the same for self-
employment tax purposes, so that a partner's, member's or shareholder's 
distributive share of income from a service entity would be subject to the 
self-employment tax. The proposal sought to eliminate the "choice of 
business fmm" decision that results in substantially different tax liability 
for otherwise similar forms of business. 
In reaction to this controversial and politically charged report, the 
American Bar Association Tax Section issued comments which provided, 
among other things, that the rules currently in effect for S corporations 
were conect and should not be changed. Specifically, the report provided 
that the self-employment tax, as well as FICA and FUT A taxes, were 
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meant to be imposed on income from labor and that the IRS has all the 
necessary "tools" in place to combat abusive situations where S 
corporations are not paying their shareholder-employees reasonable 
compensation. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-44, 1974-1 C.B. 287, Radtke v. 
US., 895 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1990), and Spicer Accounting, Inc. v. US., 
918 F.2d 80 (9th Cir. 1990). Specifically, the ABA Tax Section stated the 
following: 
Such a wholesale expansion of the base would not simply 
close the "tax gap"; instead it would represent a significant 
change in law for numerous closely-held businesses that are 
complying cunently with the law. (ABA Section of 
Taxation Comments on Additional Options to Improve Tax 
Compliance Proposed by the Staff of J. Comm. on Tax'n at 
44 (August 3, 2006)). 
As stated above, although the purpose of the new GAO study was 
purportedly to look at compliance challenges for S corporations and their 
shareholders, based on the questions that were asked by the GAO as well 
as the comments of GAO members, this sh1dy appears, at least in part, to 
take the position that the self-employment tax should be imposed on some 
or all of the income of S corporations (and in particular, S corporations 
that are service corporations). 
Because of the comments made by some of the GAO representatives as 
well as what the group perceived as an implied bias to assume and confirm 
noncompliance by S corporations, especially in connection with the 
payment of Social Security taxes, the group requested that the GAO let 
them review the Report before it was finalized. However, the Report was 
issued without the group having an opportunity to review it, and as the 
group feared, the Report contains several statements that are highly 
controversial and appear to be quite misleading, including statements that 
there have been "long-standing problems with S corporation compliance" 
and that there was misreporting on 68% of S corporation income tax 
returns. Although not expressly stated, the clear implication of the Report 
is that S corporations are somehow abenantly noncompliant and abusive. 
As will be explained in more detail below, the statements made by the 
GAO seem unwarranted, based upon the Report itself as well as other 
publicly available information. Consequently, Tom Nichols submitted a 
Records Request to the GAO to find out what, if any, evidence had been 
gathered by the GAO to support these and other controversial conclusions 
contained in the Report. 
To the surprise of the group, the GAO notified Mr. Nichols that the Senate 
Finance Committee, as the Requester of the Report, refitsed to authorize 
the release of any information relating to the Report. To put it simply, the 
members of the group were shocked at the response of the GAO and 
Senate Finance Committee, especially at a time when the President and the 
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Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service are demanding 
"transparency" from taxpayers and are stating publicly that the 
government will also be transparent in its actions. The problem is 
compounded by the fact that it has now been reported that ce1tain closed 
door negotiations relating to the pending health care bills have included 
discussions of the possibility of imposing the self-employment tax on 
some or all of the net income of S corporations as a way to raise revenue 
for these proposals. Since these proposals are being discussed in private, 
there is not any information available as to what and why such proposals 
are being made. 
Based on the group's analysis of the GAO Report, there are at least several 
respects in which the noncompliance conclusions set fmth in the Report 
are misleading. First, as stated above, the clear implication of the 68% 
misrepmting rate highlighted in the Report is that S corporations are 
aberrantly noncompliant with the Tax Code. However, a careful review of 
page 10 of the Report suggests otherwise. Although it states that "an 
estimated 68% of the S corporation returns filed for tax years 2003 and 
2004 misreported at least 1 item affecting net income," Footnote 22 to the 
Report indicates that this 68% estimate "includes misclassification 
adjustments where a taxpayer reports the correct amount but on the wrong 
line as well as the adjustments where the examiner zeroed out the entire 
return." Consequently, it appears that simply reporting a deduction 
amount on the wrong line would constitute "misrepmting" for purposes of 
the 68% noncompliance rate, even though it had no impact on the S 
corporation's taxable income or the overall tax liability of the S 
cmporation's shareholders. This raises a serious question as to what 
portion of the 68% "misreporting" percentage genuinely constitutes 
noncompliance having an actual impact on income tax revenue. 
Additionally, in the Preliminary Results of the 2003/2004 National 
Research Program published at the IRS 2009 Research Conference held on 
July 8, 2009, the indicated net misreporting percentages for S corporations 
during tax years 2003 and 2004 were 12% and 16%, respectively. This 
compares favorably with the overall compliance rate for all taxpayers 
reported in the IRS Strategic Plan 2009-2013. In that Plan, the Voluntary 
Compliance Rate for tax years 1985, 1992, 1998 and 2001 were reported 
at between 83.6% to 84.6%. This implies a net misrepmting percentage of 
15.4% to 16.4%, i.e., somewhat worse than the S corporation 
noncompliance rate. 
The second problem with the 68% "misreporting" percentage appears to 
be one of scale. In a follow-up telephone conference with Thomas D. 
Short of the GAO on January 21, 2010, Mr. Shmt indicated to Mr. Nichols 
that he thought there was some form of "de minimis" exception, such as 
$100, for which an item would not be treated as "misreported." Mr. 
Nichols specifically asked Mr. Short whether this meant if an S 
corporation reporting $10,000,000 of gross income incorrectly deducted 
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$101 of expense, its retum would be included within the "misreporting" 
category, and Mr. Short said he thought it would be. This obviously raises 
serious questions regarding the validity of the 68% misreporting 
percentage, and essentially would result in such statistic being of little 
value. (If a misclassification constitutes "noncompliance" and there is not 
a meaningful de minimis exception, it would not be surprising to find a 
noncompliance rate of 100% on any type of income tax retum.) 
Finally, it is impmiant to note that the Repmi cites deduction of ineligible 
expenses as the most common etTor. Most certainly, this is not a problem 
unique to S corporations, but is a problem which is just as prevalent, if not 
more prevalent, in sole proprietorships, partnerships (including LLCs 
taxed as partnerships), and C corporations. 
It is impmiant to recognize that S corporation status is one of the most 
popular vehicles for closely-held businesses, and as such, raising taxes on 
such entities should never be considered lightly, and ce1iainly not on the 
basis of statistics of questionable validity. Many of these same points 
were made in a follow-up letter Mr. Nichols sent to the GAO dated 
Janumy 12, 2010, shmily prior to issuance of the Report. In this regard, 
the group believes that it is important for there to be at least one structure 
whereby closely-held businesses can eam entrepreneurial profits and be 
subject to only one level of tax without the imposition of social security 
taxes (where such entrepreneurial profits are not attributable to labor). 
Additionally, increasing marginal rates on such profits at this point in the 
economic cycle is likely to be counterproductive, and even more so based 
upon misleading statistics with respect to such entrepreneurs' tax 
compliance. The critique of the GAO Repmi discussed above was set 
forth in a letter dated February 9, 2010, from Stephen R. Looney and 
Ronald A. Levitt to the Editor of Tax Notes which appeared in the 
February 22, 2010 issue of Tax Notes Today. 
In a letter dated Februmy 22, 2010 published in Tax Notes Today (Tax 
Notes Today, March 8, 2010), Timothy P. Boling, Chief Quality Officer of 
the GAO, responded to the criticism set forth above contending that the 
GAO Report was "objective and fact based." Specifically, the letter stated 
that the GAO did not seek to "change the substantive law relating to the 
application of the self-employment tax to S corporations," properly 
analyzed the IRS's National Research Program Study of S Corporation 
Compliance in determining the misreporting percentage for S corporations 
and dismissed the argument that the lack of a meaningful de minimis 
exception raised serious questions regarding the validity of the 68% 
misreporting percentage. 
Interestingly, the letter additionally states that GAO did not say "S 
corporations were abelTantly noncompliant" but instead provided the best 
data available on compliance from the IRS and put it in context. In this 
regard, the letter states that the noncompliance rate for sole proprietors in 
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2001 was 70%, which actually exceeded the 68% noncompliance rate for 
S corporations. One would expect a similar noncompliance rate for 
partnerships and LLCs. 
While the author appreciates the statements made in Mr. Boling's letter, 
and certainly acknowledges that the GAO Report did not expressly state 
that "S corporations were aberrantly noncompliant," the author believes 
that the GAO Report has been misinterpreted (as the group suspected it 
would be) to "vilify" S corporations. The author hopes that based upon 
the group's comments as well as Mr. Boling's response on behalf of the 
GAO, the Report will be considered in proper context such that it is clear 
that S corporations are no more noncompliant with the tax law than sole 
proprietorships, partnerships, LLCs or any other form of business entity. 
However, the GAO Report may very well have been a significant factor in 
the new Medicare tax imposed on certain shareholders' distributive share 
of an S corporation's operating income under the recently passed health 
insurance reform legislation, as well as the proposal to impose the self-
employment tax on ce1iain S corporations contained in The American Jobs 
and Closing Tax Loopholes Act discussed immediately below. 
13. Section 413 of the American Jobs and Closing Tax Loopholes Act of 
2010, H.R. 4213 (the "Act"), would have added new Section 1402(m) to 
subject certain S corporation shareholders to the self-employment tax 
imposed under Section 1402 on their distributive share of the income of an 
S corporation. Specifically, Section 1402(m)(1)(a) would have provided 
that in the case of any "disqualified S corporation," each shareholder of 
such disqualified S corporation who provides "substantial services" with 
respect to the "professional service business" referred to in Section 
1402(m)(l)(C) must take into account such shareholder's pro rata share of 
all items of income or loss described in Section 1366 which are 
attributable to such business in dete1mining the shareholder's net eamings 
from self-employment. 
A disqualified S corporation would have been defined m Section 
1402(m)(l)(C) as: 
• any S corporation which is a partner in a partnership which is engaged 
in a professional service business if substantially all of the activities of 
such S corporation are perfmmed in connection with such partnership; 
and 
• any other S corporation which is engaged in a "professional service 
business" if the "principal asset" of such business is the "reputation 
and skill" of three or fewer employees. 
Senator Baucus, on June 16, 2010, introduced a new substitute to the 
House-passed bill which amends the S corporation provision. 
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Unfortunately, the proposed change is minor and will not alter the hannful 
impact of this provision. Specifically, the proposal as amended by Senator 
Baucus would change the definition of a "disqualified S corporation" to 
mean any other S corporation which is engaged in a professional service 
business if "80% or more of the gross income of such business is 
attributable to the service of three or fewer shareholders of such 
cmporation." 
Section 1402(m)(3) would have defined the term "professional service 
business" as being any trade or business if substantially all of the activities 
of such trade or business involve providing services in the fields of health, 
law, lobbying, engineering, architecture, accounting, actuarial science, 
performing arts, consulting, athletics, investment advice or management, 
or brokerage services. 
Except as otherwise provided by the Secretary, a shareholder's pro rata 
share of items of the S corporation subject to the self-employment tax will 
be increased by the pro rata share of such items of each member of such 
shareholder's family (within the meaning of Section 318(a)(l)) who does 
not provide substantial services with respect to such professional service 
business. 
Additionally, Section 1402(m)(2) would provide that in the case of any 
partnership which is engaged in a professional service business, Section 
1402(a)(13) -- which generally exempts limited partners from the self-
employment tax -- shall not apply to any partner who provides substantial 
services with respect to such professional service business. 
a. Proposal is Too Broad and Unfairly Taxes Small Businesses 
Complying with Law. Although the SBCA is certainly in 
agreement with the Committee's desire to prevent taxpayers from 
abusing the S corporation stmcture to avoid payroll taxes (by 
means of paying unreasonably low compensation to shareholder-
employees), this provision will clearly increase taxes on small 
business owners who are fully complying with the law. This 
provision does not narrowly close tax loopholes for taxpayers 
abusing the system, but rather is a multi-billion dollar tax increase 
on tax-compliant small businesses in the middle of the most 
difficult economy the United States has faced since the Great 
Depression. 
b. Proposal is Inconsistent with Long-Standing Policy. Historically, 
employment taxes were intended to be imposed on income derived 
from labor. The amendments made to Section 1402 by the Act 
would apply not only to income derived from services performed 
by shareholder-employees of S corporations subject to the Act, but 
would also apply to income derived from capital by businesses 
engaged in service businesses. For example, a medical practice 
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may have made significant investments in MRI machines, X-Ray 
equipment, CT scanners and related equipment, all of which reflect 
capital investments by the owners that will generate profits not 
derived by personal services performed by the shareholder-
employees. Additionally, the proposal would subject an S 
corporation's investment in "human capital" to payroll taxes. For 
example, an S corporation conducting a medical practice may 
invest substantial sums in the hiring and training of para-
professional employees, such as nurse practitioners and physician 
assistants, who will generate profits for the S corporation not 
attributable to personal services perfmmed by the shareholder-
employees. Existing case law clearly establishes the fact that 
service businesses (regardless of the number of shareholders of 
such business) may generate income from sources other than the 
personal services of the shareholder-employees. See, e.g., 
Richlands Medical Association v. Comm 'r, TCM 1990-66, aff'd 
without published opinion, 953 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1992), and 
Pediatric Surgical Associates, P. C. v. Comm 'r, TCM 2001-81. By 
b1uning the line between income from labor and income from 
capital, this provision will set the stage for future increases in 
employment taxes on both service and non-service businesses and 
mcome. 
c. Provision Contrary to Recently Enacted Health Reform Bill. The 
new provision would also contradict and reverse the recent 
decision made by Congress in the new health care reform law. The 
Health Care and Reconciliation Act of 2010, H.R. 4872, PL 111-
152, imposes a 3.8% Medicare tax on the "net investment income" 
of individual taxpayers having adjusted gross income of more than 
$250,000 in the case of taxpayers filing a joint retum and more 
than $200,000 for all other taxpayers. The term "net investment 
income" is defined to include any gross income derived from a 
trade or business if such trade or business is a passive activity 
within the meaning of Section 469 with respect to the taxpayer. 
Consequently, when Congress adopted the new 3.8% Medicare tax 
on most fmms of investment income, it specifically exempted 
active S cmporation sltareltolders and active limited partners. 
This provision would effectively reverse that exclusion, subjecting 
some active shareholders and active limited partners to the 2.9% 
Medicare tax, and, if their income exceeds the $200,000/$250,000 
thresholds, to the additional .9% Medicare tax under the Health 
Care Bill. In other words, this provision would be a double tax 
increase on a broad class of small businesses. 
d. IRS Already has Tools Necessary to Combat Abusive Situations. 
The IRS already has all the necessary "tools" in place to combat 
abusive situations where S corporations are paying their 
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shareholder-employees umeasonably low compensation. The IRS 
has been very successful in recharacterizing S corporation 
distributions as wages subject to payroll taxes where taxpayers 
have taken compensation that was less than reasonable. See, e.g., 
Rev. Rul. 74-44, 1974-1 C.B. 287; Radtke v. US., 895 F.2d 1196 
(7th Cir. 1990); Spicer Accounting, Inc. v. US., 918 F.2d 80 (9th 
Cir. 1990); Dunn & Clark, P.A. v. US., 853 F.Supp. 365 (D. Idaho 
1994); and David E. Watson P.C. v. US., 668 F.3d 1008 (8th Cir. 
2012), aff'g 757 F. Supp. 2d 877 (S.D. Iowa 2010). The answer to 
stopping this abuse is for the IRS to do a better job enforcing 
existing law, rather than for Congress to raise taxes on numerous S 
corporations and shareholders, the large majority of whom who are 
fully complying with the law. Additionally, the SBCA is not 
aware of payroll tax abuses (actual or perceived) involving limited 
partners of limited partnerships, so the inclusion of limited 
partnerships in the provision is puzzling and appears misdirected. 
e. Provision Unfairly Discriminates Against Small Business. The 
new provision arbitrarily discriminates against small businesses by 
taxing S corporations with three or fewer key employees at higher 
tax rates than S corporations that have four or more key 
employees. There appears to be no good reason to put smaller 
businesses at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis larger 
businesses; they already lack economies of scale, and provisions 
like this make it harder for them to compete and survive. 
f. Provision Inappropriately Taxes S Corporation Shareholders on 
Other Family Members' Distributive Share of Income. The 
provision will not only subject a shareholder who provides 
"substantial services" to the S corporation to self-employment tax 
on such shareholder's distributive share of the S corporation's 
income, but also on the distributive share of the S corporation's 
income attributable to any other family member who is also a 
shareholder and who does not provide "substantial services". 
Consequently, this provision will result in a shareholder being 
subject to tax on income of other shareholders -- income to which 
the shareholder being taxed is not entitled and does not receive 
(i.e., "phantom income"). For example, assume that a medical 
practice has as its shareholders a father who has conducted the 
practice for many years and is now semi-retired. The father owns 
99% of the stock of the S corporation, and his son, who does 
provide substantial services, owns the remaining 1% of the stock 
of the S corporation. In this situation, this new provision will 
require the son to pay payroll taxes on 100% of the corporation's 
income even though the son only owns 1% of the stock of the S 
corporation and is only entitled to 1% of the funds distributed by 
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the corporation to its shareholders. Such a result seems to unfairly 
discriminate against family businesses. 
g. Provision Would Add Complexity to Tax Law. The new provision 
would introduce a host of compliance issues, and would add 
significant complexity and uncertainty for S corporations (and 
limited partnerships) engaged in professional service businesses. 
Key examples include: 
(1) The definition of the term "professional service business" 
in the provision has, contrary to decades of prior statutory 
tax law, been expanded to include lobbying, athletics, 
investment advice or management, and brokerage services. 
This arbitrarily exposes numerous closely-held businesses 
to the self-employment tax without any prior notice. For 
example, a two-person investment advisory firm or real 
estate or insurance brokerage firm, will now be subject to a 
more onerous tax scheme. This will certainly come as a 
surprise to these small businesses. This certainly cannot be 
justified on the basis of closing tax loopholes. 
(2) The provision uses the undefined tetm "substantial 
services" numerous times. How do taxpayers determine 
what substantial means? How will their advisors be able to 
advise them on that point? Many taxpayers won't know 
whether they owe the tax -- that type of uncertainty 
undetmines our tax system, which is premised on voluntary 
reporting and compliance. 
(3) The new provision would requireS corporations engaged in 
a professional service business to determine whether its 
principal asset is the "reputation and skill" (again, 
undefined) of three or fewer employees. 
S corporations engaged in a professional service business 
would be required to get valuations of each of their assets 
in order to determine their principal assets -- such a 
valuation would be extremely difficult and expensive to 
obtain, as assets such as reputation and skill are not easily 
valued. 
All of these questions will invite litigation, and are contrary 
to the long-stated Congressional goal of tax simplification. 
In addition to the complexity and uncertainty relating to the 
new provision itself, the overall effect of the new provision 
may well be to force small businesses into the much more 
complex world of partnership taxation, which will not only 
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be burdensome on these small businesses, but which also 
presents numerous tax pitfalls for uninfonned small 
businesses and, frankly, much greater potential for 
manipulation by sophisticated taxpayers. 
h. Need for S Corporations for America's Small and Family-Owned 
Businesses. Finally, it is important to recognize that S 
corporations are one of the most popular vehicles for small and 
family-owned businesses, and as such, raising taxes on such 
entities should never be considered lightly, and certainly not 
without open and informed debate and analysis of the effects of 
such taxes. There should be at least one structure whereby small 
and family-owned businesses can eam entrepreneurial profits 
subject to only one level of tax and not be subject to unlimited 
payroll taxes. 
After several unsuccessful attempts at passage of the American 
Jobs and Closing Tax Loopholes Act of 2010, the extenders bill 
with the controversial S corporation offset was defeated. 
14. On December 17, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Tax Relief, 
Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization and Job Creation Act of 2010, 
which departs from its immediate predecessor, the American Jobs and 
Closing Tax Loopholes Act of 2010, most notably in that it does not 
impose self-employment payroll taxes on the pass-through income of S 
corporation shareholders. 
15. The issue of S corporation income and distributions not being subject to 
FICA or self-employment taxes, whereas wages paid by S corporations to 
their shareholder-employees are subject to FICA taxes, continues to be a 
political "hot potato." With the release of Newt Gingrich's tax retum, a 
strong contingent of politicians once again brought to the forefront the so-
called "John Edwards Tax Dodge," claiming that S corporations are being 
used to allow their shareholders to avoid large payroll taxes. As was 
discussed in more detail in an article that appeared in Tax Notes Today, 19 
whether Newt Gingrich's structure is abusive, is far from clear, and the 
IRS itself has been schizophrenic in its pursuit of so-called abusive 
situations. For example, with C corporations, the IRS will maintain that 
the income is a dividend rather than wages so that it can maximize the 
double tax that C corporations are subject to, whereas with S corporations, 
the IRS will claim that the income is wages rather than dividend 
distributions so that it can collect FICA taxes. 
19 See, "Shades of John Edwards in Gingrich Return," 2012 TNT 15-2 (1/24/2012). 
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16. In response to the release of Newt Gingrich's tax retums, Representative 
Pete Stark introduced a bill on January 31, 2012 entitled the "NaiTowing 
Exceptions for Withholding Taxes" ("NEWT") Act.20 
17. The "Stop Student Loan Interest Rate Hike Act of 2012" (S. 2343), as 
originally proposed by Senate Majority Leader HalTy Reid, on April 24, 
2012, would have required taxpayers with incomes of more than $250,000 
to pay employment taxes on income received from an S corporation or 
limited partnership interest in a professional services business. This bill 
differs from the NEWT Act by adding the $250,000 income threshold and 
by applying only to businesses that derive 75 percent oftheir income from 
personal services, but is otherwise very similar to the bill proposed by 
Rep. Pete Stark. Representative Charles Rangel reintroduced the "NEWT" 
Act on January 22, 2013. The provision imposing self-employment tax on 
S corporations was ultimately removed from the Act. 
18. Recently, a copy of a list of tax breaks which Democrats are targeting for 
savings as part of the Joint Conference Committee on the Budget was 
obtained by Tax Analysts.21 The list highlights the so-called "S corp 
loophole," which the Budget Committee states "is a loophole . . . that 
allows certain wealthy professionals to avoid paying payroll taxes on their 
eamings." The report also refers to the loophole as the "Newt 
Gingrich/John Edwards" loophole and states that it is "used by owners of 
S corporations to avoid the 3.9% [sic] Medicare Tax on eamings, which 
costs taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars every year." The amount 
of the tax is actually 3.8% rather than 3.9% as cited in the report. 
19. The "Tax Reform Act of 2014" (discussion draft), released on February 
26, 2014, by House Ways and Means Chairman, Dave Camp (R-MI) (the 
"Camp Proposal"), includes a shocking change which imposes the self-
employment tax ("SECA") on S corporation shareholders who materially 
participate in their businesses within the meaning of Section 469. The 
Camp Proposal generally subjects 70% of the combined compensation and 
the distributive share of an S corporation's (or partnership's) combined 
and distributive share of the entity's income as net earnings from self-
employment subject to FICA or SECA, as applicable. Under present law, 
S corporations are required to pay "reasonable compensation" to their 
shareholder-employees, which is subject to FICA, but neither the income 
that passes through to the shareholders (Rev. Rul. 59-221, 1959-1 CB 225) 
or dividend distributions (Section 1402(a)(2)) made by an S corporation to 
its shareholders is subject to FICA or SECA (or the new 3.8% tax imposed 
on net investment income under Section 1411 provided that the S 
corporation shareholder materially participates in the trade or business 
conducted by the S corporation). Consequently, under cuiTent law, the 
profits of an S corporation which are distributed to its shareholders as 
20 See "Stark Introduces Bill to Remove Self-Employment 'Tax Dodge'," 2012 TNT 21-37 (1/31/2012). 
21 See "Democrats List Targets for Elimination in Budget Talks," 2013 TNT 217-1 (Nov. 8, 2013). 
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dividends are not subject to FICA or SECA taxes provided that the S 
corporation is paying reasonable compensation to its shareholder-
employees for the services they are actually rendering to the S 
. 22 
corporatiOn. 
While there certainly is a reasonable argument that different rules in the 
self-employment tax area should not apply to limited partners versus LLC 
members versus S corporation shareholders (despite the fact that there any 
many other provisions of the Code that benefit partnerships and LLCs that 
don't benefit S corporations and thus are not applied unif01mly among 
pass-through entities as a whole), the imposition of the self-employment 
tax on 70% of the total amount of compensation and distributive share of 
an entity's income is completely arbitrarl3 and not at all consistent with 
the purpose of FICA and SECA, which is to impose a tax on income 
derived from personal services actually rendered by an individual. 
Well developed law as to what constitutes "reasonable compensation" has 
provided the IRS with a successful tool for attacking abusive situations 
and recharacterizing S corporation distributions as wages subject to FICA 
in appropriate circumstances. Consequently, if any mle is to be applied 
unif01mly to all pass-through entities, it should be the rule currently in 
effect for S corporations providing that only reasonable compensation paid 
for services rendered by the owners for services they actually render to the 
entity should be subject to SECA or FICA. 
The author believes that Representative Camp's proposal would have a 
crippling effect on many small businesses which utilize pass-through 
entities (which overwhelmingly outnumber C corporations), and gives no 
credit whatsoever to the large capital investments many of these pass-
through entities, such as those in the manufacturing sector, have made in 
their businesses. Representative Camp's proposal on this issue is 
completely arbitrary and totally inequitable to pass-through entities, 
especially S corporations, which have been formed with increasing 
frequency by taxpayers to conduct their businesses in reliance upon the 
rules currently in effect regarding application of SECA and FICA to S 
corporations and their shareholders. 
20. In a report dated July 31, 2014, the "Citizens for Tax Justice" urged 
adoption of the provision in President Obama's most recent budget plan, 
which generally imposes the self-employment tax on all businesses 
providing professional services, whether structured as S corporations, 
partnerships or LLCs. 
22 See generally, Looney and Levitt, "Reasonable Compensation Issues for Closely-Held and Service Corporations," 
61stNYU Ann. Inst. Fed. Tax'n, 16 (2003). 
23 The Camp Proposal's provision on self-employment income is more onerous than the predecessor provisions 
proposing to impose self-employment tax on certain small service S corporations. See Looney, "Finding Loopholes 
in ClosingS Corp Loopholes," 2013 TNT 227-12 (November 25, 2013). 
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H. APPLICATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES AND NET 
INVESTMENT INCOME TAX TO S CORPORATIONS 
A number of commentators have recently made potentially negative comments 
regarding non-wage distributions from "personal service" S corporations being 
one of the few paths to receive income untouched by the FICA tax, Self-
Employment (SE) tax or new Net Investment Income (Nil) tax.24 
First of all it's important to recognize that non-wage distributions from a non-
personal service corporation, such as a manufacturing company, are also not 
subject to these taxes (including the Nil tax if the shareholder materially 
participates in the business). It is also important to recognize that with respect to 
personal service S corporations, the IRS and the courts can and have 
recharacterized nonwage distributions as ''wages'' subject to the FICA tax where 
umeasonably low compensation is being paid to the S corporation shareholders, 
so that personal service S corporations may not "avoid" the FICA tax on 
amounts distributed as dividends if they are in substance wages (see Radtke, 
Spicer Accounting, and the Watson case). 
Additionally, both the IRS and the courts expressly recognize that a so-called 
personal service corporation may indeed produce eamings that are properly 
characterized as dividend distributions rather than wages (see the recent Mulcahy 
case, as well as the Pediatric Surgical Associates and the Richlands Medical 
Association cases). Quite simply, the FICA and SE taxes were meant to only 
apply to wages of an individual for personal services he or she actually renders, 
and not to active operating income (profits) of a business paid out as dividend 
distributions to shareholders. On the other hand, the Nil tax was meant to 
subject certain higher income taxpayers to the 3.8% tax on passive type 
investment income, not to the profits of a business in which they materially 
participate. Consequently, any suggestion that the use of S corporations to 
"avoid" these three taxes is abusive or a "loophole" simply misses the mark as 
entrepreneurial profits of a business not attributable to wages paid for personal 
services actually rendered by a shareholder were never intended to be subject to 
any of these three taxes. 
It is also interesting to note that in a recent study, 25 the study found that S 
corporation shareholders pay the highest effective tax rate of any type of entity. 
In particular, the study found that S corporation shareholders pay an effective tax 
rate of 31.6%, partners of partnerships (which would include limited liability 
companies taxed as partnerships) pay an effective tax rate of 29.4%, C 
corporations pay an effective tax rate of 17.8% and that non-farm sole 
proprietorships pay an effective tax rate of 15.1 %. Consequently, it appears that S 
corporation shareholders are actually paying more than their fair share of taxes, 
24 See Shamik Trivedi, Jeremiah Coder, and Jaime Arora, "Practitioners Busy With Net Investment Income Tax 
I Regs," Tax Notes, Dec. 10,2012, p. 1149, Doc 2012-25152,2012 TNT 234-1. 
25 
"Report Finds S Corporations Face Highest Effective Tax Rate," 2013 TNT 153-50 (Aug. 8, 2013). The report is 
entitled "Entity Choice and Effective Tax Rates," and was prepared by Quantria Strategies, LLC. 
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and it would be inherently unfair to impose additional employment taxes on them 
under the guise of closing a tax loophole. Rather, such a provision would very 
likely have a substantial negative effect on the economic recovery of America's 
small businesses following the Great Recession. 
Several comments were also made that the Nil tax would probably not cause 
taxpayers to change their business stmctures to S corporations. The fact is, 
according to recently published IRS statistics, the number of entities filing S 
corporation retums ah'eady exceeds the number of entities filing retums as 
partnerships, and the IRS projects that the gap in the number of entities filing as S 
corporations versus partnerships will continue to grow in the future (See, 
Document 6292, Office of Research, Analysis and Statistics, Fiscal Year Retum 
Projections for the United States: 2013-2020, Rev. Fall 2013). Consequently, S 
corporations are ah·eady one of the most popular types of stmctures for small 
businesses, and the new tax on Nil should reinforce that. 
Finally, although it may be possible for an LLC member or limited partner to 
materially participate so that his or her distributive share of income would not be 
subject to the Nil tax, that would likely result in that member's or partner's 
distributive share of the income of the LLC or partnership being subject to the SE 
tax (Renkemeyer, Howell andRiether), including the increased 3.8% Medicare tax 
imposed on the self-employment income of higher income taxpayers. The correct 
answer here does not have so much to do with defining what a limited partner is 
for SE or Nil tax purposes, but rather to apply the test used in the S corporation 
area, a reasonable compensation test, to LLCs and partnerships. 
I. SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES ON S CORPORATIONS OPERATED 
THROUGH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 
In those situations in which S corporations are the choice of entity for federal tax 
purposes, it still may be preferable for a number of non-tax reasons to operate for 
state law purposes as an LLC. One important issue is whether an LLC which has 
elected to be taxed as an S corporation for federal income tax purposes will also 
be taxed as an S corporation for Social Security tax purposes rather than as a 
partnership. 
An LLC which has elected to be taxed as an S corporation should be subject to the 
same Social Security tax mles to which S corporations are subject rather than to 
the self-employment tax mles to which partnerships are subject. 
Some practitioners have cited Reg. §1.1402(a)-2(f) as requiring an entity which 
elects not to be treated as a partnership for federal income tax purposes to 
nevertheless be treated as a partnership for self-employment ta.:-c purposes. 
Specifically, Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(f) states that "an organization described in the 
preceding sentence [defining a "partnership"] shall be treated as a partnership for 
the purposes of the tax on self-employment income even though such 
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organization has elected, pursuant to Section 1361 and the regulations thereunder, 
to be taxed as a domestic corporation."26 
However, it should be noted that the reference in Reg. §1.1402(a)-2(f) to Section 
1361 is actually a reference to Section 1361 as in effect prior to its repeal in 1966 
by Pub. L. No. 89-389, Section 4(b)(1), April 14, 1966, 80 Stat. 116, which 
formerly permitted some unincorporated entities to elect to be taxed as domestic 
corporations. Following the repeal of this former Section 1361, Congress did not 
"retire" this section number, but many years later (in 1982) used it again for 
Subchapter S corporations. Consequently, it does not appear that this regulation 
in any manner would cause an LLC which has elected to be taxed as an S 
corporation to be subject to the self-employment tax as if it were a partnership. 
IV. UNREASONABLY HIGH COMPENSATION AND S CORPORATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
One area in which an S corporation could potentially face a challenge by the IRS 
for unreasonably high compensation relates to the "taxable income" limitation 
under the built-in gain tax imposed by Section 1374. 
B. GENERAL BUILT-IN GAIN TAX RULES 
Section 1374 imposes a corporate-level tax on the built-in gains of S corporations 
that were previously C corporations. Section 1374 as originally enacted applies to 
built-in gains recognized by a corporation during the 1 0-year period following 
such corporation's conversion to S status. Section 1374(d)(7). Reg. §11374-1(d) 
provides that the recognition period is the ten-calendar year period, and not the 
ten-tax year period, beginning on the first day the corporation is an S corporation 
or the day an S corporation acquires assets under Section 1374(d)(8) in a 
carryover basis transaction. The tax rate is presently 35% (the highest rate of tax 
imposed under Section 11(b)) of the S corporation's "net recognized built-in 
gain." Section 1374(b)(1). 
On September 27, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Small Business 
Jobs Act of 2010, H.R. 5297. Section 2014 of the Act amends Section 1374 to 
provide for the reduction of the recognition period during which corporations that 
converted from C corporation status to S corporation status are subject to the 
built-in gain tax from 10 years to 5 years for taxable years beginning in 2011. 
Specifically, the text of the amendment is very similar to the temporary reduction 
from 10 years to 7 years made by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2/17/2009) The text of the 
amendment reads as follows: 
26 See also, McKee, Nelson and Whitmire, Federal Taxation of Partnerships and Partners (4th Ed. 2007), 
~9.02[5](b ), which states that "a partnership that elects not to be treated as a partnership under Subchapter K 
apparently is nevertheless treated as a partnership for purposes of Section 1402." 
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(b) Special Rules for 2009, 2010 and 2011. - No tax shall be 
imposed on the net recognized built-in gain of an S corporation -
(i) in the case of any taxable year beginning in 2009 or 2010, if the 
7th taxable year in the recognition period preceded such taxable 
year, or (ii) in the case of any taxable year beginning in 2011, if the 
5th year in the recognition period preceded such taxable year. 
The amendment is applicable to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2010, 
and generally raises the same questions as were raised in connection with the 
reduction from 10 years to 7 years for taxable years beginning in 2009 and 2010. 
For a discussion of these issues, see Looney and Levitt, "Reasonable 
Compensation and The Built-In Gains Tax," 68 NYU Fed. Tax. Inst., 
115.05[1][a], [b]. [c] and [d] (2010). However, it should be noted that the 
proposed amendment specifically uses the term "taxable year" in com1ection with 
the recognition period for taxable years beginning in2009 and 2010, but only uses 
the te1m "5th year" (not taxable year) in connection with the recognition period 
for a taxable year beginning in 2011. This appears to resolve any ambiguity 
created by the previous amendment and clarifies that for dispositions in 2009 and 
2010, 7 tax years (including short tax years) need to have transpired prior to the 
year of disposition for the built-in gain tax not to apply to such dispositions, and 
that for dispositions in 2011, 2012 and 2013, 5 calendar years need to have 
transpired prior to the year of disposition for the built-in gain tax not to apply to 
such dispositions.27 
The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 similarly reduced the recognition 
period for dispositions made in 2012 and 2013 to 5 (calendar) years. 
Additionally, the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 clarified that if the 5-
year recognition period is satisfied for a disposition occUlTing in 2012 or 2013, 
such sale will not be subject to the built-in gain tax even if the purchase price will 
be received over a period of years under the installment sales method. 
The Camp Proposal reduces (permanently) the 10-year recognition period for the 
imposition ofbuilt-in gain tax imposed under Section1374 to five years, effective 
for tax years beginning after 2013. 
On June 12, 2014, the House passed H.R. 4453, the S Corporation Tax Relief Act 
of 2014, which permanently reduces the recognition period under the BIG tax to 5 
years and also permanently extends the basis adjustment for S corporations 
donating appreciated property. Hopefully the Senate will follow suit and this Bill 
(or a similar Bill) will be signed into law by President Obama. 
27 The differences between the express statutory language and the Committee Reports accompanying the 2009 Act 
raised the issue of whether Congress actually intended to use tax years rather than calendar years in measuring the 7-
year recognition period. In fact, Section 2(h) of the Tax Technical Corrections Act of 2009, H.R. 4169, 111 
Congress, 1st Session, which was introduced on December 2, 2009, but which did not pass, would have changed the 
phrase "7th taxable year" to "7th year" in Section 1374(d)(7)(B) retroactively for tax years beginning after 2008. 
With the passage of the Small Business Jobs Act of2010, it appears that Congress has conceded that tax years will 
apply to the special 7-year rule applicable to dispositions in 2009 and 2010 but that calendar years will be used for 
the special 5-year rule applicable to dispositions made in 2011. 
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C. TAXABLE-INCOME LIMITATION 
In addition to the limitation placed on the aggregate amount of net built-in gains 
that may be recognized by an S corporation under the NUBIG limitation, the 
taxable-income limitation limits the amount of net built-in gains recognized by an 
S corporation on an annual basis. Because a corporation's taxable income may 
serve as the base for the built-in gains tax, the maximum amount of net built-in 
gains (built-in gains less built-in losses) that must be recognized by an S 
corporation in a particular tax year within the BIG Period is limited to the amount 
of the corporation's taxable income for such year (the taxable-income limitation). 
Section 1374(d)(2)(A)(ii) and Reg. §1.1374-2(a)(2). 
Any recognized built-in gain that is not subject to the built-in gains tax because of 
the taxable income limitation must be carried forward and is subject to the built-in 
gains tax in the S corporation's succeeding tax years during the recognition period 
to the extent that it subsequently has other taxable income (that is not already 
subject to the built-in gains tax) for any tax year within the BIG Period. Section 
1374(d)(2)(B), as amended by Section 1006(f)(5) of the Technical and 
Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 (TAMRA), Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 
3342 (1988). This modification reduced potential manipulation of timing post-
conversion losses to avoid the built-in gains tax on the corporation's NUBIG, and 
applies only to corporations filingS elections on or after March 31, 1988. 
D. ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE PLANNING OPPORTUNITIES 
1. General. Because the accounts receivable of a cash-basis corporation are 
included in determining a corporation's NUBIG, and the collection of 
such receivables is treated as a recognized built-in gain under Section 
1374, the cash-basis corporation, and particularly the cash-basis service 
corporation, is potentially subject to a substantial tax liability under 
Section 1374. Consequently, it is imperative that the cash-basis service 
corporation converting from C corporation status to S corporation status 
consider all available planning opportunities to minimize the impact of the 
built-in gains tax with respect to its accounts receivable. 
2. Zeroing Out of Taxable Income. Since the base of the built-in gain tax 
is limited to a corporation's taxable income, one method of avoiding the 
built-in gain tax would be to zero out the corporation's taxable income for 
the entire 10-year built-in gain period. Such a strategy seems inadvisable 
in that it could very well subject the S corporation to the same 
unreasonable compensation arguments to which it would have been 
subject had it remained a C corporation. An S corporation would be 
susceptible to an umeasonable compensation argument in this context 
since the result of recharacterizing amounts paid as compensation to the 
shareholder-physicians as distributions would be to increase the 
corporation's taxable income above zero, and thus, subject it to the built-in 
gain tax. 
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3. Bonus Accrual Method. An altemative method of avoiding the built-in-
gain tax on the accounts receivable of a cash basis taxpayer is to accrue 
bonuses (in an amount equal to its receivables) to its shareholder-
employees in its last tax year as a C corporation and pay such bonuses to 
its shareholder-employees during the first two and one-half (2-1/2) months 
of its first tax year as an S corporation. Although there are a number of 
open issues with regard to this strategy, Ltr. Rul. 200925005 confirms that 
this strategy does work. 
In Ltr. Rul. 200925005, the IRS ruled that the payment of ce1iain salary 
expenses and other outstanding costs relating to the production of the 
outstanding accounts receivable of the corporation at the time of its 
conversion to S status would constitute built-in deduction items, 
specifically including the payment of compensation to shareholder-
employees of the corporation within the first two and one-half months 
following the corporation's conversion to S corporation status. 
Under the facts of the ruling, the taxpayer is a cash basis C corporation 
with a calendar tax year. The corporation is a personal service corporation 
which is wholly-owned by a number of professionals. The corporation 
bills its clients for the services performed by the professionals and when 
invoices are paid, the corporation pays salaries and wages to the 
professionals. Additionally, the corporation has other employees, such as 
non-shareholder clerical staff and non-shareholder professionals to which 
it pays wages. 
The taxpayer will elect to be an S corporation and will have built-in gain 
from its outstanding accounts receivable. The taxpayer requested the 
letter ruling to dete1mine whether certain salary expenses and other 
outstanding costs relating to the production of the outstanding accounts 
receivable as of the date of the corporation's conversion to S status will 
qualify as built-in losses under Section 1374, and specifically, whether the 
amounts paid to its shareholder-employees within the first two and one-
half months of the recognition period under Section 1374 of salary and 
wage expenses that are related to the production of accounts receivable 
that are outstanding as of the effective date of the S election will constitute 
built-in deduction items under Section 1374(d)(5)(B). 
The post-conversion collection of accounts receivable of a cash-basis 
corporation, particularly the cash-basis service corporation, is potentially 
subject to a substantial tax liability for the built-in gain tax imposed under 
Section 1374. Due to the pass-through nature of an S corporation, the 
collection of accounts receivable by a cash-basis corporation that has 
converted from C corporation status to S corporation status, absent proper 
planning, will result in a forced double taxation on such receivables of 
approximately 60.74%?8 Consequently, it is imperative that the cash-
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basis service corporation converting from C corporation status to S 
corporation status consider all available planning opportunities to 
minimize the impact of the built-in gain tax with respect to its accounts 
receivable. 
Since built-in deduction items (such as accounts payable of cash-basis 
corporations) are taken into account in determining NUBIG of an S 
corporation under Section 1374(d)(5)(C), and the payment of such 
amounts is treated as a recognized built-in loss that may be matched 
against built-in income items (such as a cash-basis corporation's accounts 
receivable), a common method that has been employed by practitioners to 
avoid the built-in gain tax imposed on the accounts receivable of a cash 
basis service corporation is to accme bonuses (in an amount equal to its 
collectible receivables) to its shareholder-employees in its last tax year as 
a C corporation and pay such bonuses to its shareholder-employees in its 
first tax year as an S corporation. Even though such accmed bonuses may 
or may not be characterized as built-in deduction items (depending on 
whether they are paid in the first two and one-half months following 
conversion), the effect of accming such bonuses nevertheless may be 
either to eliminate the potential application of the built-in gain tax 
altogether by reducing the corporation's NUBIG to zero, or alternatively, 
if the corporation has goodwill or other appreciated assets, to at least 
minimize recognition of any built-in gains by reducing the corporation's 
NUBIG by the amount of such accmed bonuses. There are a number of 
open issues regarding the mechanics of accming such bonuses. These 
open issues include: 
• whether such bonuses should be paid within the first two and one-half 
months so as to constitute built-in deduction items that offset the 
built-in income items (receivables), or whether such bonuses may be 
paid at any time during the corporation's first taxable year as an S 
corporation based on the position that the accmed bonuses reduce the 
corporation's NUBIG to zero; 
• if the corporation intends to pay such bonuses in cash within the first 
two and one-half months and funds must be borrowed to pay such 
bonuses, whether the corporation or the shareholder-employees 
should borrow such funds; 
• whether such bonuses could be paid by simply having the corporation 
distribute the accounts receivable attributable to the accmed bonuses 
within the first two and one-half months following conversion to S 
corporation status (as opposed to paying such bonuses out in cash); 
28 Assuming $100 of accounts receivable, the built-in gain tax would be $35 ($100 x 35%), and the shareholder-
level tax (assuming the maximum marginal individual tax rate of 39.6%) would be $25.74 ($65 x 39.6%). Thus, 
total taxes on the $100 of accounts receivable would be $60.74 ($35 + $25.74), resulting in an effective federal tax 
rate of 60.74%. In addition, state corporate income taxes may be imposed on the corporate level gain. 
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• whether the regular salaries of the shareholder-employees should be 
"suspended" in order to enable the corporation to pay such bonuses; 
• assessment of the effect of such bonuses on any buy-out provision in 
the event a shareholder-employee's employment is terminated after 
receipt of the bonus but prior to any loans funding such bonus being 
repaid; 
• whether the employment agreements of the shareholder-employees 
should be amended to provide compensation for nonbillable services 
to suppoti compensation paid in "C" years as well as accmal of the 
bonus; 
• documentation of such accmed bonuses in the minutes of the board of 
directors as compensation for past services; and 
• whether the corporation should continue zeroing out its taxable 
income for some period of time in order to support compensation 
amounts paid in prior "C" years as well as to provide a "back-up" for 
the bonus accmal strategy. 
Although Ltr. Rul. 200925005 certainly does not answer all of these open 
questions, it certainly makes it clear that the built-in gain tax on accounts 
receivable can be avoided by the converted corporation paying out 
compensation related to such accounts receivable to its shareholder-
employees within the first two and one-half months of the corporation's 
first tax year as an S corporation, which is the method that has been most 
commonly employed by practitioners in order to avoid imposition of the 
built-in gain tax on the accounts receivable of a cash basis service 
corporation. 
The IRS expressly concludes in the mling that the taxpayer's payments to 
its shareholder-employee of salary and wages relating to the production of 
accounts receivable on the effective date of the S election, if paid in the 
first two and one-half months of the recognition period, qualify as built-
in loss items under Section 1374(d)(5)(B). Additionally, the IRS found 
that the taxpayer's payments to its non-shareholder employees of salary 
and wages related to the production of outstanding accounts receivable on 
the effective date of the S election, if paid at any time during the 
recognition period, will qualify as built-in loss items under Section 
1374(d)(5)(B). Finally, the IRS concluded that the taxpayer's payments of 
other unpaid payable expenses and accounts payable related to the 
production of the accounts receivable outstanding on the effective date of 
the S election, if paid at any time during the recognition period, would 
qualify as built-in loss items under Section 1374(d)(5)(B). 
It is interesting to note that Ltr. Rul. 200925005 did not specifically state 
that any type of special bonus had to be accmed prior to the last day of the 
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corporation's last tax year as a C corporation or require any written 
evidence of such accrual in the corporate minutes or other documentation. 
Rather, the IRS simply concluded that the payment of salary and wages to 
the shareholder-employees of the corporation which related to the 
production of the accounts receivable on the effective date of the S 
election would qualify as built-in loss items if paid in the first two and 
one-half months of the recognition period. To be certain, the author would 
recommend that such bonus be accrued prior to the last tax year as a C 
corporation and evidenced at least in the Board of Director minutes of the 
corporation. 
4. Acceleration of Accounts Receivable. Another method of avoiding 
forced double taxation on its receivables, is for the cash basis service 
corporation converting from C to S corporation status to accelerate its 
receivables income and recognize such income prior to conversion to S 
corporation status. In this manner, the corporation may be able to defer 
(possibly indefinitely) shareholder-level tax on its receivables until the 
earnings and profits generated by the collection of such receivables are 
distributed to the corporation's shareholders. The recognition of 
receivables income by a corporation prior to its conversion to S 
corporation status will have the added benefit of decreasing its overall 
NUBIG. The pre-conversion recognition of receivables income may be 
achieved in at least three ways. 
First, the corporation may simply assign and sell its accounts receivable 
prior to its conversion to S corporation status to a third party. 
Second, the corporation may sell its accounts receivable to its shareholder-
employees prior to its conversion to S corporation status. Additionally, in 
each of the first two alternatives, the sale of the receivables could be 
combined with the payment of a bonus in an amount equal to the sales 
proceeds in order to avoid payment of a corporate level tax on the 
corporation's sale of its receivables. 
Finally, the corporation could, in order to avoid a pre-conversion C 
corporation tax on the sale of its accounts receivable, simply "bonus" its 
accounts receivable to its shareholder-employees. The pre-conversion 
recognition of receivables income by a service corporation, when 
combined with the payment of a colTesponding bonus to its shareholder-
employees, should also limit any attempts by the IRS to recharacterize 
payments to the corporation's shareholder-employees as dividend 
distributions under unreasonable compensation arguments to the 
corporation's last tax year as a C corporation. 
5. Summary of Accounts Receivable Planning Alternatives. The zeroing 
out of an S corporation's taxable income in order to avoid the built-in gain 
tax could very well subject the S corporation to the traditional 
unreasonably high compensation arguments to which C corporations are 
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subject. Thus, a better method to avoid the built-in gain tax is to accrue a 
bonus in an amount equal to receivables in its final C year. This method 
also produces the lowest amount of tax and the greatest amount of defenal 
on the entire amount of tax due (provided the corporation has no other 
built-in gain items). Alternatively, the sale of the corporation's 
receivables prior to its conversion to S corporation status will accelerate 
the corporate level tax due on the receivables, but may result in an 
indefinite defenal of the shareholder level tax on the earnings and profits 
generated by the sale of the receivables. The sale of receivables in a cash-
basis service corporation's last C year with a conesponding bonus in the 
amount of its receivables or the bonus of its receivables will result in a 
single level of tax and a one year acceleration of income in comparison to 
the bonus accrual alternative. The alternatives involving the sale or bonus 
of the cash-basis service corporation's receivables in its last C year also 
have the added benefit of limiting any unreasonable compensation 
arguments to its last year as a C corporation, rather than exposing the 
corporation to such an argument in years following its conversion to S 
corporation status when the corporation may be subject to the built-in 
gains tax imposed under Section 1374. 
Consequently, the tax practitioner must analyze the specific facts and 
circumstances of each situation, including the total compensation package 
othetwise being paid to the shareholder-employees of the corporation in its 
last year as a C corporation, in order to determine the optimal planning 
alternative regarding the cash-basis service corporation's receivables. In 
no event, however, should the cash-basis service corporation merely 
convert to S corporation status without engaging in any planning to 
minimize the built-in gains tax which will be imposed under Section 1374 
on such corporation's receivables. 
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